Can hinge epistemology close the door on epistemic relativism?

Abstract

I argue that a standard formulation of hinge epistemology is host to epistemic relativism and show that two leading hinge approaches (Coliva's acceptance account and Pritchard's nondoxastic account) are vulnerable to a form of incommensurability that leads to relativism. Building on both accounts, I introduce a new, minimally epistemic conception of hinges that avoids epistemic relativism and rationally resolves hinge disagreements. According to my proposed account, putative cases of epistemic incommensurability are rationally resolvable: hinges are propositions that are the objects of our belief-like attitudes and are rationally revisable in virtue of our overarching commitment to avoid systematic deception in our epistemic practices. 1 This motivation for relativism can be found in Kusch (2013;2016a) andCarter (2017); see also Baghramian & Coliva (2019, ch. 7). Furthermore, there are different definitions of relativism, as well as different arguments that motivate it (arguments from underdetermination (Barnes and Bloor 1982) and semantic considerations (MacFarlane 2014, Kölbel 2003). In this paper, I will work with a formulation of relativism from incommensurable disagreements as this is a form of relativism that seems most pressing for hinge epistemology.

Moderatism and Truth

“…Coliva ( , xiii, 2023) also makes room for less general hinges like <The Earth has existed for a very long time>, which she treats as necessary for many empirical inquiries.8 N  gets textual support from OC (110, 130, 166, 359). 9 Several authors have taken issue with Coliva's  (seeAvnur, 2023;Barranco López, 2023;Piedrahita, 2021;Zanetti, 2021). I comment on Avnur and Barranco López' strategies in footnote 21.…”

What philosophical disagreement and philosophical skepticism hinge on

“…Although seePiedrahita (2021) andNeta (2019) for an alternative account in which hinges (some of them anyway) play an evidentialist role. 12 This view certainly isn't shared by all hinge epistemologists.…”

Prejudice in Testimonial Justification: A Hinge Account

“… 17 The worry of relativism might arise here; however, this is not a necessary outcome in the hinge perspective. See Pritchard (2011), Kusch (2016), Coliva (2019 b ), and Piedrahita (2021). …”