Can You Restore My “Own” Body? A Phenomenological Analysis of Relational Autonomy

Slatman, Jenny; Zeiler, Kristin; Devisch, Ignaas

doi:10.1080/15265161.2016.1187219

Cited by 5 publications

(6 citation statements)

References 6 publications

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“…Reflections on why certain acts in practice may be justified or not require (i) invitations for patients to share the way that they experience ‘themselves’ and (ii) for professionals to imagine how treatments may affect patients’ sense of bodily identity and self (Slatman, Zeiler, & Devisch, ), that is how they are ‘in themselves’ as human persons. In this context, HCAT could usefully guide diverse projects that concern improvements in care and/or reflective work with staff to explore motivations for, and personal resources, that sustain a capacity to care.…”

Section: Discussionmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…Reflections on why certain acts in practice may be justified or not require (i) invitations for patients to share the way that they experience 'themselves' and (ii) for professionals to imagine how treatments may affect patients' sense of bodily identity and self (Slatman, Zeiler, & Devisch, 2016), that is how they are 'in themselves' as human persons.…”

Section: Discussionmentioning

confidence: 99%

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Facilitating a dedicated focus on the human dimensions of care in practice settings: Development of a new humanised care assessment tool (HCAT) to sensitise care

et al. 2018

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There is limited consensus about what constitutes humanly sensitive care, or how it can be sustained in care settings. A new humanised care assessment tool may point to caring practices that are up to the task of meeting persons as humans within busy healthcare environments. This paper describes qualitative development of a tool that is conceptually sensitive to human dimensions of care informed by a life-world philosophical orientation. Items were generated to reflect eight theoretical dimensions that constitute what makes care feel humanly focused. An action research group process in 2014-2015 with researchers, service users, healthcare professionals in two diverse clinical settings (stroke rehabilitation and dermatology) was used. Feedback on conceptual content, transparency of meaning and readability was then gained from a panel in Sweden and third-year student nurses in the UK. The tool can be applied to attune staff to human dimensions of care, offering items which point to concrete examples of humanising and dehumanising features of practice in ways that have not yet been fully captured in the caring literature. Based on theoretically led experiential items, with dedicated focus on what makes people feel more, or less than human, it may offer improvement on available assessments of care.

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Section: Discussionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Section: Discussionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Facilitating a dedicated focus on the human dimensions of care in practice settings: Development of a new humanised care assessment tool (HCAT) to sensitise care

et al. 2018

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“…(2018, 32 For relevant discussions of the intertwined and situated character of our autonomy and agency, see Jacobson (2004Jacobson ( , 2009, Russon (2003), and van den Berg (1972). See also Slatman, Zeiler, and Devisch (2016) for their discussion of the autonomy of the bodily self as always already heteronomous (18-19).…”

Section: Conclusion: Caring For People Involves Caring For Spatiamentioning

confidence: 99%

Spatiality and Agency: A Phenomenology of Containment

Jacobson

2020

Puncta

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In this essay, I consider how spatial experience is fundamentally connected to the development and maintenance of “existential healthy” agency. More specifically, I examine how our formation as choosing, active, and self-defining persons is dependent upon the spatially-thick and interpersonally-interwoven “gestures” through which we develop a lived sense of space as supportive and cooperative or hostile and threatening. I conclude from this both that existentially healthy agency is always already a relational capacity, and, more central to my focus here, that it depends in significant part upon the cultivation of an appropriately supportive spatial environment.

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“…Within bioethics and moral philosophy, there have been a few attempts to provide philosophical investigations into the nature of autonomy by appealing to concepts and principles in classical phenomenology (see, e.g., Mackenzie 2008a ; Käll and Zeiler 2014 ; Hendl 2016 ; Slatman et al 2016 ; Lewis and Holm 2022 ). The aims of the most developed and substantive of these accounts (i.e., Mackenzie 2008a ; Käll and Zeiler 2014 ; Lewis and Holm 2022 ) have not only been to theoretically explain and justify the general idea that autonomy is embodied, affectively constituted, and—on the basis of phenomenological conceptions of selfhood—inherently relational, but also to situate phenomenological approaches to autonomy in relation to traditional, individualistic accounts and more recent—and increasingly common—theories of relational autonomy.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

“… 1 Meyers ( 2005 ) has explicitly acknowledged some of the ways in which one’s body contributes to one’s autonomy, but, although we are, in part, motivated by her claims, her work in this area remains undertheorized. Others have considered the relationship between autonomy and the body from a phenomenological perspective (see, e.g., Mackenzie 2008a ; Käll and Zeiler 2014 ; Hendl 2016 >; Slatman et al 2016 ; Lewis and Holm 2022 ), and we explain below how the discussions in this article relate to some of these accounts and what our contribution to this body of research is. …”

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confidence: 99%

Towards a concept of embodied autonomy: In what ways can a patient’s body contribute to the autonomy of medical decisions?

Lewis

Holm

2023

Med Health Care and Philos

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Abstract“Bodily autonomy” has received significant attention in bioethics, medical ethics, and medical law in terms of the general inviolability of a patient’s bodily sovereignty and the rights of patients to make choices (e.g., reproductive choices) that concern their own body. However, the role of the body in terms of how it can or does contribute to a patient’s capacity for, or exercises of their autonomy in clinical decision-making situations has not been explicitly addressed. The approach to autonomy in this paper is aligned with traditional theories that conceive autonomy in terms of an individual’s capacities for, and exercises of rational reflection. However, at the same time, this paper extends these accounts by arguing that autonomy is, in part, embodied. Specifically, by drawing on phenomenological conceptions of the experience of autonomy, we argue that, in principle, the body is a necessary component of the capacity for autonomy. Secondly, through the presentation of two different cases, we highlight ways in which a patient’s body can contribute to the autonomy of treatment choices. Ultimately, we hope to encourage others to explore additional conditions under which a concept of embodied autonomy should be employed in medical decision making, how its underlying principles might be operationalised in clinical situations, and its consequences for approaches to patient autonomy in healthcare practice, policy, and law.

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Can You Restore My “Own” Body? A Phenomenological Analysis of Relational Autonomy

Cited by 5 publications

References 6 publications

Facilitating a dedicated focus on the human dimensions of care in practice settings: Development of a new humanised care assessment tool (HCAT) to sensitise care

Facilitating a dedicated focus on the human dimensions of care in practice settings: Development of a new humanised care assessment tool (HCAT) to sensitise care

Spatiality and Agency: A Phenomenology of Containment

Towards a concept of embodied autonomy: In what ways can a patient’s body contribute to the autonomy of medical decisions?

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