Canada and the Changing Security Architecture of the Indo-Pacific Region

Abstract

The growing confrontation between the U.S. and China is drawing an increasing number of countries into this process. For Canada, which is more closely tied to the U.S. than any other country in the world, choosing a side in this confrontation was an obvious decision. Over the past two years, Canada has taken active steps to support the U.S. strategy to contain China in the Indo-Pacific region. First, in November 2022 the Trudeau government published Canada's Indo-Pacific strategy for the first time and allocated funds for its implementation. As part of this strategy, Trudeau’s government began annually deploying an additional (third) frigate to the region, increased the participation of the Canadian Armed Forces in military exercises alongside American and Japanese troops, and is developing military-technical cooperation with South Korea. Like the U.S., Canada also supports the Philippines in its territorial dispute with China in the South China Sea. Mirroring the actions of the U.S. and its closest allies in the region, Canada signed several defense and security agreements with the Philippines between 2023 and 2024. However, the U.S. does not consider Canada a valuable partner in the region because of its limited military strength and excludes Canada from new multilateral structures in the region. Canada's inability to fit into the new Indo-Pacific security architecture may encourage it to integrate into this regional security system not through U.S. assistance, but by establishing closer military ties with the United States' primary ally in the region, Japan. This approach would allow Canada to become part of the new Indo-Pacific security architecture alongside Japan.