Carbon emission reduction decisions of supply chain members under cap-and-trade regulations: A differential game analysis

Wang, Yilei; Xu, Xin; Zhu, Qinghua

doi:10.1016/j.cie.2021.107711

Cited by 92 publications

(35 citation statements)

References 41 publications

Supporting

Mentioning

Contrasting

Order By: Relevance

“…This paper has built a more complete, more complex, and more practical three-level supply chain. As mentioned in the conclusions in [21], [24], [28], the study of a more complex supply chain structure is an inevitable direction of supply chain research at present and in the future.…”

Section: Numerical Simulation and Results Analysismentioning

confidence: 98%

“…As seen from Table 2, the research object of supply chain green technology innovation has been limited to a single firm, such as in [12], [20], [28], [29]; between upstream and downstream enterprises in the supply chain, including one supplier and one manufacturer, such as in [21], [24], 27]; or between one manufacturer and one retailer, such as in [18], 19], [22], [23], [25]. [26] also studied a two-level supply chain with two competing downstream retailers .…”

Section: Numerical Simulation and Results Analysismentioning

confidence: 99%

“…In addition to the carbon tax, researchers have also studied the impact of other carbon emission reduction policies on optimal supply chain operations. For example, [21], [22] studied the game problem of upstream and downstream members of the supply chain under the carbon cap-and-trade schema and obtained the optimal carbon emission level and profit distribution mechanism among game players. Yuan et al studied how the government provides subsidies for carbon emission reduction and how it affects the optimal level of carbon emissions in the supply chain and the level of green product marketing efforts [23].…”

mentioning

confidence: 99%

See 2 more Smart Citations

Greening, Pricing and Marketing Coordination for a Complex Three-Level Supply Chain Under the Carbon Tax in China

Guo

2022

IEEE Access

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

This paper examines a complex supply chain consisting of a raw material manufacturer, a consumer goods fabricator, a retailer and an end user. A sequential decision game model is constructed under carbon tax regulation, considering multiparty green technology innovation and green product marketing efforts in the supply chain. Using a backward-induction analysis process, the Nash equilibria of the game are obtained. With the help of numerical simulation, the sensitivity analysis of the key parameters affecting system performance is carried out. We find the following results. (i) Carbon tax regulation brings about a new cost burden for supply chain members in different ways, with the largest impact being on the profit of the raw material manufacturer. (ii) The marginal emission reduction effect of carbon tax regulation shows a declining trend. The cost of greening efforts will exceed the carbon tax rate as it continues to rise. (iii) Customer demand is significantly affected by the footprint and energy efficiency of products and is much more relevant for energy efficiency than for footprint in the production phase.INDEX TERMS carbon tax, game, green technology renovation, simulation, supply chain I. INTRODUCTION

show abstract

Section: Numerical Simulation and Results Analysismentioning

confidence: 98%

Section: Numerical Simulation and Results Analysismentioning

confidence: 99%

mentioning

confidence: 99%

See 1 more Smart Citation

Greening, Pricing and Marketing Coordination for a Complex Three-Level Supply Chain Under the Carbon Tax in China

Guo

2022

IEEE Access

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

show abstract

“…In order to motivate the firm to invest, the other firms in the supply chain can adopt various cooperation strategies. Wang et al [ 40 ] studied three cooperation scenarios: non-cooperation, a cooperation program, and a two-way cooperation contract. In each cooperation scenario, they developed differential game models by which to study the emission reduction decisions.…”

Section: Literature Reviewmentioning

confidence: 99%

Incentive Mechanisms for Carbon Emission Abatement Considering Consumers’ Low-Carbon Awareness under Cap-and-Trade Regulation

Xue

Sun

Yao

2022

IJERPH

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

In the era of sustainable development, reducing carbon emissions and achieving carbon neutrality are gradually becoming a consensus for our society. This study explores firms’ incentive mechanisms for carbon emission abatement in a two-echelon supply chain under cap-and-trade regulation, where consumers exhibit low-carbon awareness. To boost the manufacturer’s motivation for abatement, the retailer can provide four incentive strategies, i.e., price-only (PO), cost-sharing (CS), revenue-sharing (RS), and both (cost and revenue) sharing (BS). The equilibrium decisions under the four incentive strategies are obtained by establishing and solving game models. A two-part tariff contract is also proposed to coordinate the low-carbon supply chain. Finally, through comparisons and analyses, we find that: (1) Consumers’ high low-carbon awareness can boost the manufacturer’s incentive for carbon emission abatement (CEA), thus increasing supply chain members’ profits. (2) It is more effective for the retailer to share its revenue to incentivize the manufacturer for abatement than to bear the investment cost of CEA. Thus, Strategy RS is better than Strategy CS and equivalent to Strategy BS. (3) The manufacturer and retailer have consistent incentive strategy preference under cap-and-trade regulation. Both firms prefer the incentive strategy with a higher cooperation level. (4) The incentive strategy with a higher cooperation level can also bring higher eco-social welfare under certain conditions.

show abstract

“…Luo et al used a difference game to analyze carbon emission reduction decisions of supply chain members under the cap-and-trade system. It was found that, compared with non-cooperation, two enterprises that choose to cooperate could make more emission reduction efforts and gain more profits [ 32 ]. Song et al constructed an evolutionary game model, analyzed the synergistic effects of regulatory policies, and used system dynamics to conduct a simulation analysis.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Evolutionary Game Analysis of Carbon Emission Reduction between Government and Enterprises under Carbon Quota Trading Policy

Chen

Liu

2022

IJERPH

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

As one of the most efficient means of emission reduction policies, carbon quota trading has a far-reaching impact on the carbon emission reduction of enterprises. Firstly, a two-party evolutionary game model of enterprise and government and a three-party evolutionary game model of enterprise–enterprise–government are constructed based on the multi-agent driving mechanism, evolutionary game theory, scenario simulation, and other methods. Then, we conduct a series of policy simulations for carbon emission under different scenario models and various enforcement strengths. Lastly, the behavioral strategies and system evolution trajectories in enterprises and government carbon trading are comprehensively investigated. The results show that in the two-party and three-party evolutionary game models, the carbon trading behavior is affected by the joint action of the enterprise and the government. The difference in initial willingness mainly affects the speed of the subject’s convergence to the steady state. Based on this, policy suggestions are proposed, such as reducing the cost of carbon emission of enterprises, enhancing the vitality of carbon emission reduction of enterprises, and stimulating the power of government regulation and responsibility performance, which can provide suggestions for the development of the carbon market.

show abstract

Carbon emission reduction decisions of supply chain members under cap-and-trade regulations: A differential game analysis

Cited by 92 publications

References 41 publications

Greening, Pricing and Marketing Coordination for a Complex Three-Level Supply Chain Under the Carbon Tax in China

Greening, Pricing and Marketing Coordination for a Complex Three-Level Supply Chain Under the Carbon Tax in China

Incentive Mechanisms for Carbon Emission Abatement Considering Consumers’ Low-Carbon Awareness under Cap-and-Trade Regulation

Evolutionary Game Analysis of Carbon Emission Reduction between Government and Enterprises under Carbon Quota Trading Policy

Contact Info

Product

Resources

About