Carnap meets Foucault: conceptual engineering and genealogical investigations

Novaes, Catarina Dutilh

doi:10.1080/0020174x.2020.1860122

Cited by 19 publications

(3 citation statements)

References 34 publications

Supporting

Mentioning

Contrasting

Order By: Relevance

“…10 10 Dutilh Novaes (2020) adds that conceptual engineering exhibits “meta‐normative neutrality”: the general framework of conceptual engineering is compatible with whatever purpose one might want to achieve by it. Establishing these purposes, in turn, requires a normative input that is external to the framework (cf.…”

mentioning

confidence: 99%

Conceptual engineering: A road map to practice

2022

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

This paper discusses the logical space of alternative conceptual engineering projects, with a specific focus on (1) the processes, (2) the targets and goals, and (3) the methods of such projects. We present an overview of how these three aspects interact in the contemporary literature and discuss those alternative projects that have yet to be explored based on our suggested typology. We show how choices about each element in a conceptual engineering project constrain the possibilities for the others, thereby giving rise to distinct groupings of possible projects under the banner of conceptual engineering. We conclude with a critical reflection on the potential ethical issues that arise as a result of effec tively putting conceptual engineering into practice.

show abstract

mentioning

confidence: 99%

Conceptual engineering: A road map to practice

2022

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

show abstract

“… See, e.g., Brun (2016,Cappelen (2018, ch. 2),Simion and Kelp (2020),Eklund (2002Eklund ( , 2019Eklund ( , 2021,Scharp (2013), and Dutilh Novaes (2020a, 2020b2017).…”

mentioning

confidence: 99%

Function-Based Conceptual Engineering and the Authority Problem

Queloz

2022

Mind

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

In this paper, I identify a central problem for conceptual engineering: the problem of showing concept-users why they should recognize the authority of the concepts advocated by engineers. I argue that this authority problem cannot generally be solved by appealing to the increased precision, consistency, or other theoretical virtues of engineered concepts. Outside contexts in which we already aim to realize theoretical virtues, solving the authority problem requires engineering to take a functional turn and attend to the functions of concepts. But this then presents us with the problem of how to specify a concept’s function. I argue that extant solutions to this function specification problem are unsatisfactory for engineering purposes, because the functions they identify fail to reliably bestow authority on concepts, and hence fail to solve the authority problem. What is required is an authoritative notion of conceptual function: an account of the functions of concepts which simultaneously shows why concepts fulfilling such functions should be recognized as having authority. I offer an account that meets this combination of demands by specifying the functions of concepts in terms of how they tie in with our present concerns.

show abstract

“… 3 For example, see Brigandt and Rosario ( 2020 ), Brun ( 2016 ), Burgess and Plunkett ( 2013a ), Burgess and Plunkett ( 2013b ), Cappelen ( 2017 ), Cappelen ( 2018 ), Cappelen and Plunkett ( 2020 ), Chalmers ( 2020) , Dutilh Novaes ( 2020b ), Eklund ( 2014 ), Floridi ( 2011 ), Haslanger ( 2020 ), Machery ( 2017 ), Nado ( 2020a ), Plunkett ( 2015 ), Plunkett ( 2016 ), Prinzing ( 2018 ), Scharp ( 2020 ), Simion ( 2018b ), Thomasson ( 2020 ), among many others. …”

mentioning

confidence: 99%

Which Concept of Concept for Conceptual Engineering?

Isaac

2021

Erkenn

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

Conceptual engineering is the method for assessing and improving our concepts. However, little has been written about how best to conceive of concepts for the purposes of conceptual engineering. In this paper, I aim to fill this foundational gap, proceeding in three main steps: First, I propose a methodological framework for evaluating the conduciveness of a given concept of concept for conceptual engineering. Then, I develop a typology that contrasts two competing concepts of concept that can be used in conceptual engineering—namely, the philosophical and psychological ones. Finally, I evaluate these two concepts of concept using the proposed methodological framework and I show that, when it comes to making conceptual engineering an actionable method, the psychological concept of concept outclasses its philosophical counterpart on all counts. This provides a baseline from which the concept of concept can be further improved for the purposes of conceptual engineering.

show abstract

Carnap meets Foucault: conceptual engineering and genealogical investigations

Cited by 19 publications

References 34 publications

Conceptual engineering: A road map to practice

Conceptual engineering: A road map to practice

Function-Based Conceptual Engineering and the Authority Problem

Which Concept of Concept for Conceptual Engineering?

Contact Info

Product

Resources

About