Cascading contingent protection

Hoekman, Bernard M.; Leidy, Michael P.

doi:10.1016/0014-2921(92)90063-3

Cited by 81 publications

(24 citation statements)

References 7 publications

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“…As we go through the model in steps, we explain how each assumption can be linked to the US AD proceedings. 11 Our specific assumptions with regards to the AD procedure in the US are based on an extensive literature that includes but not limited to works by Hoekman and Leidy (1992), Sleuwaegen et al (1998), Blonigen andHaynes (2002, 2010), and Blonigen and Prusa (forthcoming). We characterize the protection granting decision by a government with a welfare function that exhibits loss aversion as the one developed by Freund andÖzden (2008).…”

Section: A Model Of Cascading Trade Protectionmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…Both Hoekman and Leidy (1992) and Sleuwaegen et al (1998) emphasize that upstream protection will increase the probability that protection will be granted (θ) if sought by the downstream industry.…”

Section: Cascading Protection Market Structure and Upstream Incentivesmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…In their seminal paper, Hoekman and Leidy (1992) propose that when an upstream industry seeks protection that stands to severely harm its domestic downstream customers, the motivation must lie in the expectation that the transmission of injury will make downstream protection more likely. Thus, we now examine whether potential cascading protection creates incentives for upstream industries to pursue protection in the first place.…”

Section: A Highermentioning

confidence: 99%

“…However, they do not match upstream/downstream pairs and thus do not establish causality between upstream TTB measures and subsequent demand for TTBs by their downstream counterparts. 6 Hoekman and Leidy (1992) present a theoretical model, based on their earlier work on rent-seeking (Leidy and Hoekman, 1991) that explains how a downstream industry will follow its upstream counterpart in petitioning for AD duties due to depressed profits. Their model also explains why downstream users will not necessarily object to trade protection on their intermediate goods as long as they will also obtain protection.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…Their paper offers a neat cost-benefit analysis of cascading protection but does not discuss the role of market structure. Sleuwaegen et al (1998) extend Hoekman and Leidy (1992) by 4 Note that this structure can be applied to all types of trade policy, and not just TTBs. We use TTBs to proxy for trade policy changes because they are the most transparent and frequently used type of time-varying trade policy in the US during [1995][1996][1997][1998][1999][2000][2001][2002][2003][2004][2005][2006][2007][2008][2009][2010][2011][2012][2013].…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

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Cascading Trade Protection: Evidence from the US

Erbahar

2016

SSRN Journal

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Standard-Nutzungsbedingungen:Die Dokumente auf EconStor dürfen zu eigenen wissenschaftlichen Zwecken und zum Privatgebrauch gespeichert und kopiert werden.Sie dürfen die Dokumente nicht für öffentliche oder kommerzielle Zwecke vervielfältigen, öffentlich ausstellen, öffentlich zugänglich machen, vertreiben oder anderweitig nutzen.Sofern die Verfasser die Dokumente unter Open-Content-Lizenzen (insbesondere CC-Lizenzen) zur Verfügung gestellt haben sollten, gelten abweichend von diesen Nutzungsbedingungen die in der dort genannten Lizenz gewährten Nutzungsrechte. (2014) which identifies the key factors and their interactions that cause cascading protection to motivate our empirical analysis. Then, we test our model by identifying the input-output relationships among the time-varying temporary trade barriers of the US using its detailed input-output tables. Terms of use: Documents inAs predicted by the theory, we find that measures on imported inputs increase the likelihood of their downstream users' subsequent trade remedy petition over the 1988-2013 period. Moreover, our simulation exercise shows that cascading protection can cause additional welfare losses, and hence we propose that trade policy investigations should take vertical linkages into account.JEL codes: F1, F13, F14, F68

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Section: A Model Of Cascading Trade Protectionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Section: Cascading Protection Market Structure and Upstream Incentivesmentioning

confidence: 99%

Section: A Highermentioning

confidence: 99%

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

See 3 more Smart Citations

Cascading Trade Protection: Evidence from the US

Erbahar

2016

SSRN Journal

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The Chain Effect of an Antidumping Policy

Kao¹,

Cheng

2018

Southern Economic Journal

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This article uses a successive duopoly model to show that some antidumping retaliation may in fact be a chain effect of an antidumping policy. Findings present that if dumping initially takes place in the home countrys final good market, then antidumping protection in the final good market will result in dumping in the foreign countrys input market, thus leading to further antidumping protection, which will reinforce the incentive of the home downstream firm to initially petition for antidumping protection. Moreover, we demonstrate that an antidumping duty in vertically related markets may not provide this industry with adequate protection. Finally, when taking the antidumping chain effect into account, we show that the government which initially faces the dumping may determine a higher antidumping duty if the production inefficiency of the home upstream firm relative to the foreign upstream firm is in the medium range.

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Why There is Never Peace in International Trade: The Case of Canada-U.S. Economic Relations

Dufey

Hommel²

2000

Fallstudien Zum Internationalen Management

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Cascading contingent protection

Cited by 81 publications

References 7 publications

Cascading Trade Protection: Evidence from the US

Cascading Trade Protection: Evidence from the US

The Chain Effect of an Antidumping Policy

Why There is Never Peace in International Trade: The Case of Canada-U.S. Economic Relations

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