2015
DOI: 10.1016/j.jeconbus.2015.04.003
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CEO power, ownership structure and pay performance in Chinese banking

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Cited by 55 publications
(36 citation statements)
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“…Our results reveal that concentrated ownership is associated with lower levels of executive remuneration. Also, they support the notion that direct oversight by controlling shareholders is a substitute for executive remuneration in the mitigation of agent-principal conflicts (Hassen et al, 2015;Luo, 2015). In addition, we found that CEO duality and a high proportion of insiders on the BD also reduce the level of compensation, whereas the opposite is true for BDs with a high proportion of independent members.…”
Section: Introductionsupporting
confidence: 83%
See 1 more Smart Citation
“…Our results reveal that concentrated ownership is associated with lower levels of executive remuneration. Also, they support the notion that direct oversight by controlling shareholders is a substitute for executive remuneration in the mitigation of agent-principal conflicts (Hassen et al, 2015;Luo, 2015). In addition, we found that CEO duality and a high proportion of insiders on the BD also reduce the level of compensation, whereas the opposite is true for BDs with a high proportion of independent members.…”
Section: Introductionsupporting
confidence: 83%
“…International studies confirm the influence of ownership concentration on the level of executive remuneration. Smaller compensations are awarded in markets with concentrated capital (Croci, Gonenc, & Ozkan, 2012;Firth, Fung, & Rui, 2007;Hartzell & Starks, 2003;Luo, 2015) and more lavish packages are offered in settings of shareholding dispersion (Jiang et al, 2009;John, Mehran, & Qian, 2010 In addition to addressing the question of ownership concentration, we evaluated the effect of BD structure on executive remuneration to determine to what extent the relationship between ownership concentration and remuneration is moderated by aspects of BD structure, as predicted by the MPA, which is relatively unexplored in the Brazilian setting.…”
Section: Ownership Concentration and Executive Remunerationmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…The board size of the directors and the ratio of non-executive directors on the board size are included to control for board independence. In addition, the high frequency of board meeting suggests the importance of the board and effective corporate governance (Luo, 2015). Board meeting frequency is controlled for as the number of meetings per year.…”
Section: Resultsmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…The direct holdings are those shares held by the CEO at the end of the year, while the indirect shares include all shareholding of the CEO in other firms that have significant interest in the firm they manage. The CEO ownership is therefore measured as the percentage of the CEO's direct and indirect shares to the total equity of the firm (Dowell et al 2011;Duru et al 2016;Luo 2015). The second of the three independent variables is CEO education.…”
Section: Independent Variablesmentioning
confidence: 99%