Change without Transformation: Social Policy Reforms in the Philippines under Duterte

Abstract

This article explores social policy reforms championed by the Philippines’ strongman president Rodrigo Duterte during his first three years in office (2016–19), as a case for examining the transformative potential of social policy expansion under rising new right‐wing and authoritarian leaders. By showing how political economy and historico‐institutional conditions foreclose the transformative possibilities of the social policy changes effected by Duterte, the author offers a critique of current tendencies in global development discourses to treat all forms of social policy expansion as progressive. In the Philippines case, there is no progressive ideology guiding the reforms, nor are there political movements overseeing the expansion of social rights now inscribed in law. Rather, the reforms institutionally entrench a minimalist approach to universalism and strengthen the foothold of poverty targeting as an organizing principle of social provisioning. Social policy expansion under Duterte manifests aspects of the ‘dark side’ of social policy reforms during the current global political moment, including the use of such policy reforms to legitimize a conservative and authoritarian political order, and the functionality, across the political spectrum, of ‘narrow universalism’ — the type championed by international development agencies — which serves to deepen segmentation in social provisioning.

Remembering love: Memory work of orphaned children in the Philippine drug war

“…Duterte's drug war has altered what it means and how to conduct communitybased interventions in the country (Hechanova et al, 2018;Yusay & Canoy, 2019). Such repressive and punitive political conditions amplified by Duterte's authoritarian rule further create a segmented system of social provisioning in favor of those currently in power (Ramos, 2020). The absence of a specific government program catering to the unique needs of Filipino orphaned children and their families-left-behind (e.g.…”

Rodrigo Roa Duterte: A Jingoist, Misogynist, Penal Populist

“…While Joseph Estrada and Jejomar Binay were often compared to Thailand's Thaksin Shinawatra, whose anti-elite rhetoric and pro-poor programs were tainted by scandals and corruption, Duterte's brand of populism is often compared to that of Donald Trump (Curato, 2017a). Duterte's "anti-elitist" stance appears to be directed only at those sections of the elite outside his own governing coalition (Ramos, 2020).…”

“…This strand of populism has been described as "penal" or "punitive" (Curato, 2016). It involves the political practice of courting votes by preying on citizens' anxieties about security and safety, through the promotion of punitive short-term solutions to address criminality, often at the expense of respecting human rights (Ramos, 2020).…”

“…Electoral polling data from the 2016 election suggest that even as he won votes across socio-economic classes, Duterte's strongest base of support comprised younger, wealthier, and more educated sections of the population (Ramos, 2020). This appears to be borne out by polls conducted a month before the elections, on the basis of which Teehankee and Thompson (2016a) opine that "the Duterte phenomenon is not a revolt of the poor.…”

“…They constitute a section of the population for whom the global division of labor has provided pathways out of poverty but not necessarily into affluence and security. It is not difficult to see how Duterte's electoral pitch to deal with issues of criminality and the country's crumbling urban infrastructure would resonate with them (Ramos, 2020).…”