Class, clientelism, and coercion: Some mechanisms of internal dependency and control

Flynn, Peter

doi:10.1080/14662047408447207

Cited by 43 publications

(17 citation statements)

References 10 publications

Supporting

Mentioning

Contrasting

Unclassified

Order By: Relevance

“…While agrarian policy outputs that filter down through clientilist structures certainly benefit the large marginal peasantry, state patronage of the rural sector 'comes fairly close to representing the stock-in-trade of conservative regimes that hope both to avoid a redistribution of land or wealth and to forestall any possibility of a rural insurrection' [Scott, 1976: 215]. Clientilism in the underdeveloped countries thus defines the mechanisms of class control through which the peasantry is demobilised and inducted into the national political process [Flynn, 1974].…”

Section: Peasants Class Politics and The Patron-client Conceptmentioning

confidence: 98%

“…It has been argued that the continuing vitality of patron-client relationships in peasant political behaviour in the underdeveloped regions is related to incomplete capitalist rationalisation [Leys, 1971;Flynn, 1974]. Local and parochial concerns suffuse political perceptions in such peasant communities, and clientilism becomes an adaptive device through which peasant demands for economic security are channelled into the political system.…”

Section: Peasants Class Politics and The Patron-client Conceptmentioning

confidence: 99%

See 1 more Smart Citation

Peasants, the state and policy constraints: The political economy of rural development in peninsular Malaysia 1957–69

Doshi

1988

The Journal of Peasant Studies

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

This article draws attention to two propositions concerning the analysis of public policy formation. First, such analysis should take account of inherent constraints that the state faces in the formulation and implementation of its economic policies. Second, policy analysis must necessarily deal with specific historical contexts within which constraints on state policy formation operate. The main purpose of this article is to apply these two propositions to a study of the rural development strategy pursued by the Alliance government in Peninsular Malaysia. A second purpose is to derive from the empirical case certain theoretical implications which can be relevant for the analysis of the role of the state in economic development.

show abstract

Section: Peasants Class Politics and The Patron-client Conceptmentioning

confidence: 98%

Section: Peasants Class Politics and The Patron-client Conceptmentioning

confidence: 99%

Peasants, the state and policy constraints: The political economy of rural development in peninsular Malaysia 1957–69

Doshi

1988

The Journal of Peasant Studies

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

show abstract

“…Il existe en outre une autre hiérarchie au sein des groupes, tous les clients n'étant pas égaux : les clients qui font preuve d'un appui plus généreux à l'endroit du patron et de ses projets politiques bénéfi-cient de plus grands avantages. Enfin, la concurrence individualisée pour des produits et services en quantité finie divise les classes inférieures, minant ainsi la solidarité de l'organisation (Flynn, 1975). Néanmoins, les données provenant de l'échelon local à Mexico démontrent que les ÉP peuvent parfois satisfaire aux trois critères de performance interreliés recherchés -performance institutionnelle, performance économique et performance psychologique -que les démocraties en émergence encore fragiles ne parviennent pas à atteindre, dans bien des cas.…”

Section: Attentes à L'égard De La Démocratie Et Limitations De Ce Sysunclassified

La relation complexe entre clientélisme et démocratie1

Hilgers¹

2012

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

Si le clientélisme, l’achat de votes, le patronage et les autres échanges personnels de même nature ont des répercussions négatives sur la démocratie, la chaîne de causalité n’est pas unidirectionnelle. Dans maintes démocraties en émergence, la précarité des assises du régime et la réactivité erratique du gouvernement dans des économies stagnantes incitent les politiciens et les électeurs à recourir aux échanges personnels. Or, lorsque les acteurs s’en remettent aux échanges personnels pour combler les brèches dans la représentation et la réactivité, ils choisissent des méthodes qui vont à l’encontre de la consolidation des institutions démocratiques, sans toutefois accepter l’asservissement à l’autorité. La dynamique des échanges personnels accompagne des changements sociopolitiques de plus grande envergure et ces échanges sont plus ou moins négociables et participatifs, selon le contexte. La présente étude vise à examiner cette dynamique au moyen de l’étude du cas de la ville de Mexico, où les gouvernements du Parti révolutionnaire démocratique (PRD) et leurs électeurs s’emploient à promouvoir la démocratie et l’égalité, tout en se livrant à des échanges personnels.Clientelism, vote-buying, patronage, and other such personal exchanges have a negative effect on democracy, but the chain of causality is not unidirectional. In many developing democracies, weak regime consolidation and erratic government responsiveness in stagnant economies motivate politicians and voters to use personal exchanges. When actors opt for personal exchanges to fill gaps in representation and responsiveness, they are choosing methods at odds with the consolidation of democratic institutions, but they are not surrendering to authoritarian subjugation. The dynamics of personal exchanges accompany broader sociopolitical changes and are negotiable and participatory to a degree dependent on their context. This paper seeks to analyze these dynamics through a case study of Mexico City, where the governments of the Democratic Revolutionary Party and their constituents champion democracy and equality, while also engaging in personal exchanges

show abstract

“…The emphasis has now moved to the examination of modes of production, class formation and interaction, the articulation of which is free from determination by spatial logic (Bozzoli, 1980;Foster-Carter, 1978;Mafeje, 1981;Raikes, 1978). However, the "primacy of class" as argued by Crush (1980, p. 347) has not precluded a discussion of the interconnections between spatial structure and political economy.…”

mentioning

confidence: 96%

“…At this community level, Kenyan politics still operates within a framework of patronage and clientelism (Mutiso, 1975;Okumu, 1968;Tomlinson, 1982, p. 25) but the objective of control, or 'internal dependency' as Flynn (1974) terms it, takes precedence over genuine representation (Bienen, 1974). Indeed, the proletariat and peasantry have been extrinsic to political conflict in Kenya, which tends to be characterised by division within the bourgeoisie, notably between national and local elements (Lamb, 1974;Leo, 1978;Leys, 1975Leys, , 1982Rana, 1977), often stimulated by the dictates of international capitalism (Godfrey and Langdon, 1976;Kaplinsky, 1982;Kirinyaga, 1974;Langdon, 1976;Leys, 1975).…”

mentioning

confidence: 98%

Rethinking Regional Inequality: The Case of Kenya

Wellings¹

1983

South African Geographical Journal

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

ABSTRACf Tomlinson (1982) presents evidence of accelerating regional inequality in Kenya and proceeds to interpret this observation with reference to the country's underlying class structure. It is argued here that this mode of explanation is far from convincing and complete, not only in terms of data analysis but also in the method of conceptualizing socio-economic inequality on a regional basis.

show abstract

Class, clientelism, and coercion: Some mechanisms of internal dependency and control

Cited by 43 publications

References 10 publications

Peasants, the state and policy constraints: The political economy of rural development in peninsular Malaysia 1957–69

Peasants, the state and policy constraints: The political economy of rural development in peninsular Malaysia 1957–69

La relation complexe entre clientélisme et démocratie1

Rethinking Regional Inequality: The Case of Kenya

Contact Info

Product

Resources

About