Collaborative strategy within China's emission trading scheme: Evidence from a tripartite evolutionary game model

Zhang, Xinyue; Guo, Xiaopeng; Zhang, Xingping

doi:10.1016/j.jclepro.2022.135255

Cited by 17 publications

(5 citation statements)

References 47 publications

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“…The results indicate that incentive and cap-and-trade policy is beneficial to channel members. In addition, it can also set a reasonable proportion of free carbon quotas and a higher carbon price to mobilize enterprises to reduce emissions [44]. For example, Jiao, Pan and Li [31] investigated the carbon trading scheme on the decision of retired EV battery recycling CLSC, which illustrated that higher free carbon quotas discourage recycling and echelon utilization.…”

Section: Green Clsc Carbon Policymentioning

confidence: 99%

Optimizing Green Strategy for Retired Electric Vehicle Battery Recycling: An Evolutionary Game Theory Approach

Zheng,

2023

Sustainability

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As the global new energy vehicle (NEV) industry rapidly expands, the disposal and recycling of end-of-life (EOL) power batteries have become imperative. Efficient closed-loop supply chain (CLSC) management, supported by well-designed regulations and strategic investments, plays a crucial role in sustainable waste power battery recycling. In this study, an evolutionary game theory (EGT) methodology is used to construct a tripartite game model to investigate the interactions among manufacturers, recyclers, and the government to study the decision-making dynamics of green investments. In addition, numerical simulations are performed to evaluate the sensitivity of the relevant parameters on the stability of the evolution of the system. The results reveal that government green subsidies can stimulate early period investments in advanced recycling technologies. However, as the battery recycling industry matures, a ‘free-rider’ behavior emerges among enterprises, which can be mitigated through the imposition of a carbon tax. Eventually, as the industry reaches maturity, manufacturers and recyclers autonomously invest for enhanced profitability. This research provides valuable insights for government policy formulation, facilitating the formal recycling of retired batteries and fostering sustainability in the NEV sector.

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Section: Green Clsc Carbon Policymentioning

confidence: 99%

Optimizing Green Strategy for Retired Electric Vehicle Battery Recycling: An Evolutionary Game Theory Approach

Zheng,

2023

Sustainability

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“…In reference to the relevant research [34,35], the correctness of the analysis was further tested through a numerical simulation to reveal the stability of the equilibrium strategy of the evolutionary game with different factors influencing the elements and to seek insights into the governance of data resale behavior in data trading. Considering that (1, 1, 0) is the ideal equilibrium state when the data trading platforms govern, the data suppliers innovate positively and the data demanders do not sell data, the conditions that must be satisfied are…”

Section: Numerical Simulationmentioning

confidence: 99%

Evolutionary Game Analysis of Data Resale Governance in Data Trading

Sun

Zhang

et al. 2023

Systems

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Data trading is important for optimizing the allocation of data elements. However, data can be easily copied, disseminated, or resold, leading to disorderly development in the data trading market, and raising the issue of data governance. Data trading involves various participants, while existing research lacks an understanding of participant interactions and strategy adoption, as well as determination of optimal strategies for the participants. To address these gaps and provide insights for the governance of data trading platforms, this paper proposes an evolutionary game model for the governance of data trading involving three parties: data suppliers, demanders, and trading platforms. Our findings reveal that data trading platforms choosing to govern, data suppliers choosing to innovate positively, and data demanders choosing not to resell can be achieved under certain conditions. We also find that an increase in the price of data trading or the number of transactions can weaken the effectiveness of platform governance and make data trading more difficult to govern. Additionally, the incentives for data innovation provided by the trading platform can significantly promote data suppliers to innovate data positively. However, when these incentives are too high, the platform may weaken its level of governance or even move towards non-governance. Increasing penalties for data resale weakens data demanders’ motivation to resell data, and a higher probability of data resale being reported lowers their motivation to do so. By examining the role of different participants in data trading, the model proposes ways to improve the efficiency and robustness of the data market while better protecting the interests of data traders.

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“…Enterprises and verification agencies might conspire to pursue their benefits, resulting in obstacles to low-carbon transformation initiatives (Chen et al, 2023). Additionally, government oversight may be lacking, which can directly contribute to a decrease in intrinsic motivation for transitioning to low-carbon practices (Zhang et al, 2023). Given the presence of interaction mechanisms among governments, verification agencies, and enterprises, a game theory emerges as an optimal approach for examining the behavior and strategies of these three stakeholders in the lowcarbon transition process.…”

Section: Basic Assumptionsmentioning

confidence: 99%

Can command-and-control policy drive low-carbon transition in energy-intensive enterprises? -a study based on evolutionary game theory

Zhou,

Han,

Zhang

2023

Front. Energy Res.

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There are two views on whether command-and-control policy can promote carbon emission reduction: the “compliance cost” theory and the “innovation compensation” theory. In this paper, we construct an evolutionary game model among energy-intensive enterprises, verification agencies, and local governments from the game theory perspective to explore the impact of command-and-control policy on the low-carbon transition of energy-intensive enterprises. The interaction mechanism of the three actors and the main factors affecting the low-carbon transition of the enterprises are further analyzed with the help of the MATLAB simulation method. The study results show that command-and-control policies can promote the low-carbon transition of enterprises and have a suppressive effect on bribery behavior. In the actual game process, enterprises will compare the cost of low-carbon transition with that of no low-carbon transition. The cost of low-carbon transition is higher when the government’s incentives and penalties are small, so there is a “compliance cost” effect, and the government cannot promote low-carbon transition by increasing the intensity of regulation. On the contrary, when the government’s incentives and penalties are strong enough, enterprises will make a low-carbon transition spontaneously in the face of continuously increasing environmental regulation intensity, which supports the theory of “innovation compensation.” In addition, increasing the profitability of product sales and increasing the cost of bribes are also effective ways to promote low-carbon transition. Finally, relevant policy recommendations were proposed based on the main conclusions. This work opens up a new perspective for environmental regulation theory and provides a theoretical reference and practical basis for developing low-carbon transition.

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Collaborative strategy within China's emission trading scheme: Evidence from a tripartite evolutionary game model

Cited by 17 publications

References 47 publications

Optimizing Green Strategy for Retired Electric Vehicle Battery Recycling: An Evolutionary Game Theory Approach

Optimizing Green Strategy for Retired Electric Vehicle Battery Recycling: An Evolutionary Game Theory Approach

Evolutionary Game Analysis of Data Resale Governance in Data Trading

Can command-and-control policy drive low-carbon transition in energy-intensive enterprises? -a study based on evolutionary game theory

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