Color Illusion

Abstract

As standardly conceived, an illusion is an experience of an object o appearing F where o is not in fact F. Paradigm examples of color illusion, however, do not fit this pattern. A diagnosis of this uncovers different sense of appearance talk that is the basis of a dilemma for the standard conception. The dilemma is only a challenge. But if the challenge cannot be met, then any conception of experience, such as representationalism, that is committed to the standard conception is false. Perhaps surprisingly, naïve realism provides a better account of color illusion.

Object‐Dependent Thought Without Illusion

“…This position may be hard to support across the board for all cases of illusion and hallucination. But I think some examples of colour illusion fit this view; see Kalderon ().…”

Naïve Realism and Illusion

“…However, a naïve realist can't appeal to such properties because he thinks 17. a number of philosophers have provided accounts of illusion that appeal to looks understood along these lines. See, for example, Travis (2004), antony (2011), Kalderon (2011), and Genone (2014). Brewer's (2011: Chapter 5) account of illusion also appeals to "looks," but he does not take these to be mind-independent properties of objects with which subjects can be perceptually acquainted (see Footnote 18 below).…”

Rethinking naive realism

“…Happily, for our purposes it is enough to note that by ''S is being appeared to in a roundish way'' I roughly mean that S is appeared to in the way that I would be appeared to were I to now be confronted by a round thing under ideal conditions. 24 My use of ''appearance properties'' is different from Genone (2014), Antony (2011), Kalderon (2011), Shoemaker (1994, 2000 and others' use of ''appearance properties''. On their use of the term, appearance properties are not properties that subjects can have, but properties that objects or scenes can have.…”