Comparing transposition in the 27 member states of the EU: the impact of discretion and legal fit

Steunenberg, Bernard; Toshkov, Dimiter

doi:10.1080/13501760903226625

Cited by 89 publications

(64 citation statements)

References 32 publications

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“…The first key result is that discretion matters for customization (Steunenberg and Toshkov 2009;Toshkov 2010 (Sager et al 2014). This 'refined domestic politics' mechanism is, however, not the only path to extensive customization.…”

Section: Theory Evaluationmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…Domestic opposition can only be influential when institutions do not effectively shelter the policy-making body from societal demands (Haverland 2000;Steunenberg and Toshkov 2009;Toshkov 2010 …”

Section: Institutionsmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…Regulatory leeway matters for implementation (Steunenberg and Toshkov 2009;Töller 2010). Knill and Lenschow (2003) distinguish EU governance modes through their level of obligation and the amount of discretion granted.…”

Section: Eu Regulatory Modementioning

confidence: 99%

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Customizing Europe: transposition as bottom-up implementation

Thomann¹

2015

Journal of European Public Policy

126

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European Union (EU) implementation research has neglected situations when member states go beyond the minimum requirements prescribed in EU directives (goldplating). The top-down focus on compliance insufficiently accounts for the fact that positive integration actually allows member states to transcend the EU's requirements to facilitate context-sensitive problem-solving. This study adopts a bottom-up implementation perspective. Moving beyond compliance, it introduces the concept of 'customization' to depict how transposition results in tailor-made solutions in a multi-level system. The study analyzes the hitherto unexplored veterinary drug regulations of four member states. Using fuzzy-set Qualitative Comparative Analysis and formal theory evaluation, this paper assesses how policy and country-level factors interact. Results reveal the countries' different customization styles. The latter simultaneously reflect the interplay of domestic politics with institutions, and the 'fit' of EU regulatory modes with domestic, sectoral interventionist styles. Compliance approaches cannot fully explain these fine-grained patterns of Europeanization.

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Section: Theory Evaluationmentioning

confidence: 99%

Section: Institutionsmentioning

confidence: 99%

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Customizing Europe: transposition as bottom-up implementation

Thomann¹

2015

Journal of European Public Policy

126

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“…EU rules often leave room for discretion in terms of how to comply (Steunenberg and Toshkov 2009;Versluis 2007;Conant 2002;Dimitrova and Steunenberg 2016). How politicians react within this manoeuvrable space and the extent to which they adhere to EU law is a conditioning factor on outcomes (Steunenberg and Toshkov 2009;Conant 2002). Consequently, domestic politics is a factor that should be considered when studying the implementation of EU rules.…”

Section: Welfare Migration Dynamic Rules and Domestic Responsesmentioning

confidence: 99%

Free movement of people and cross-border welfare in the European Union: Dynamic rules, limited outcomes

Martinsen

Rotger

Thierry

2018

Journal of European Social Policy

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For decades, the European legislators and the Court of Justice have extended the rights to free movement and cross-border welfare in the European Union (EU). Strong assumptions on the impact of these rules have been posed, by some held to lead to welfare migration and thus to be a fundamental challenge to the welfare state. However, studies of how these rules are implemented and what become the de-facto outcomes hereof remain scarce. We address this research gap, by examining domestic responses to and outcomes of dynamic EU rules. Based on a unique set of administrative data, we do so for all EU citizens residing in the universalistic, tax-financed welfare state of Denmark between 2002-2013. We find that domestic responses have been restrictive and outcomes limited.

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“…Whereas some studies suggest that federal structures lead to transposition flaws (Haverland/Romeijn 2007;Linos 2007;König/Luetgert 2009;Thomson 2010), others demonstrate that federalism has a negligible impact on implementation (Mbaye 2001;Steunenberg/Toshkov 2009). However, favourable effects of federalism on the implementation process have never been described (Toshkov 2010, 24-44).…”

Section: Other Factors Influencing Implementationmentioning

confidence: 99%

Member states’ opposition in the Council of the European Union and its impacts on the implementation of directives

Pircher

2017

ozp

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In the Council of the European Union (EU), a qualified majority is mostly required to adopt legislative acts. Based on this majority rule, individual member states can be outvoted and are subsequently obliged to implement the law. This article analyses whether opposition in the Council of the EU affects the transposition of directives into national law by using the example of Austria from 2000 to 2008. The results demonstrate that domestic factors, rather than a negative political attitude, were responsible for delays and procedures when implementing previously contested directives. However, the effects of opposition in the Council on implementation were particularly apparent in cases where there was a high degree of misfit between EU provisions and the domestic legal structure. Keywords SchlüsselwörterEuropäische Union, Rat der EU, oppositionelles Wahlverhalten, Österreich, Implementation von Richtlinien, rechtlicher Misfit Acknowledgements I would like to express my sincere thanks to all the interview partners for their time and the information they provided. This article presents the findings of a dissertation project conducted at the University of Vienna. I am grateful to my supervisor, Gerda Falkner, and my two reviewers and examiners, Heinrich Neisser and Andrea Lenschow, for their valuable comments and reviews in the process of completing the project. I would also like to thank the former members of the Institute for European Integration Research for their useful comments on an earlier version of this paper.The author has declared that no competing interests exist.

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Comparing transposition in the 27 member states of the EU: the impact of discretion and legal fit

Cited by 89 publications

References 32 publications

Customizing Europe: transposition as bottom-up implementation

Customizing Europe: transposition as bottom-up implementation

Free movement of people and cross-border welfare in the European Union: Dynamic rules, limited outcomes

Member states’ opposition in the Council of the European Union and its impacts on the implementation of directives

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