Competing for Transparency: Political Competition and Institutional Reform in Mexican States

Abstract

Why do political actors undertake reforms that constrain their own discretion? We argue that uncertainty generated by political competition is a major driver of such reforms, and test this argument using subnational data on Mexican states’ adoption of state-level access to information (ATI) laws. Examining data from 31 Mexican states plus the Federal District, we find that more politically competitive states passed ATI laws more rapidly, even taking into account the party in power, levels of corruption, civil society, and other factors. The fine-grained nature of our data, reflecting the staggered timing of elections, inauguration dates, and dates of passage, allows us to distinguish between different theoretical mechanisms. We find the greatest evidence in favor of an insurance mechanism, by which incumbent parties who face uncertainty over future political control seek to ensure access to government information, and means of monitoring incumbents, in the future in case they lose power.

Nothing to hide: Commitment to, compliance with, and impact of the special data dissemination standard

“…States that engage in this type of behavior would clearly face a significant political cost in increasing the transparency of their data collection, compilation, and dissemination. Alternatively, Berliner (), Berliner and Erlich (), and Berliner ()—all find that a competitive political environment increases the incentives for political actors to introduce transparency initiatives. Focusing on data transparency, Williams () finds that the release of data by the government improves bureaucratic quality, investment, and financial sector development in the short as well as in the long run.…”

“…This paper, therefore, contributes not only to the literature on transparency and the IMF, but also to the broader literature on international organizations. Although there is a growing body of literature analyzing the importance of transparency in governance and economic policies (Berliner, ; Berliner & Erlich, ; Bussell, ; Kumah & Brazys, ; Vadlamannati & Cooray, , ), we are aware of none that analyze accession to the SDDS and its effectiveness in promoting data transparency. In the sections below, we first briefly describe the SDDS before developing theoretical expectations for why states might commit to and comply with the initiative.…”

ynamic Transparency: An Audit of Mexico’s Freedom of Information Act 

“…Berliner and Erlich (2015) show that political parties turn to FOIA as a means of monitoring their opponents. Roberts (2006) explains how civil society has used well-targeted information requests to expand transparency's reach and even influence the public debate.…”

Transnational advocacy and domestic law: International NGOs and the design of freedom of information laws

“…Today over 90 countries around the world have passed FOI laws, over half of them since 2000. Research on the global spread of FOI laws has focused on factors including global diffusion, civil society advocacy, and domestic political structures (Ackerman and Sandoval-Ballesteros 2006, Berliner 2014, Berliner and Erlich 2015, Florini 2007, Puddephatt 2009, Michener 2010, Michener 2011, McClean 2011, Relly 2012, Roberts 2006. This paper, however, focuses not on passage but specifically on the design of FOI laws.…”