Conflict in Context: Arms Transfers and Third World Rivalries during the Cold War

Kinsella, David

doi:10.2307/2111597

Cited by 54 publications

(30 citation statements)

References 24 publications

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“…Research on conventional arms sales has examined the effect of military transfers on regional stability (e.g., Kinsella 1994;Kinsella and Tilemma 1995;Sanjin 1999), and the causes of conventional arms exports in specific supplier states. For example, Blanton (2000Blanton ( , 2005 has studied the link between democracy, human rights and U.S. arms sales, Fuhrmann (2008) has examined U.S. exports of dual-use commodities that could be used in legitimate civilian applications or in WMD programs, and Donaldson and Donaldson (2003) have explained a 2001 Russian-Chinese military cooperation agreement.…”

Section: Explaining Nuclear Proliferation and Arms Exportsmentioning

confidence: 99%

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Exporting the Bomb: Why States Provide Sensitive Nuclear Assistance

Kroenig

2009

Am Polit Sci Rev

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Why do states provide sensitive nuclear assistance to nonnuclear weapon states, contributing to the international spread of nuclear weapons? Using a new dataset on sensitive nuclear transfers, this paper analyzes the determinants of sensitive nuclear assistance. I first describe a simple logic of the differential effects of nuclear proliferation, which I use to generate hypotheses about the conditions under which states provide sensitive nuclear assistance. I then show that the strategic characteristics of the potential nuclear suppliers are the most important determinants of sensitive nuclear assistance. Explanations that emphasize the importance of economic motivations do not find support in the data. This paper presents a new approach to the study of the spread of nuclear weapons, focusing on the supply side of nuclear proliferation.

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Section: Explaining Nuclear Proliferation and Arms Exportsmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…Blanton 2000;Kinsella 1994), and the effect of nuclear proliferation on the probability of war and crisis behavior (e.g. Schelling 1960;Powell 1990;Sagan and Waltz 1995), but have not examined the supply side of nuclear proliferation.…”

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confidence: 99%

Exporting the Bomb: Why States Provide Sensitive Nuclear Assistance

Kroenig

2009

Am Polit Sci Rev

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“…These initial analyses of reciprocity were later joined by a second wave of research addressing the dynamics of interstate cooperation and conflict (Goldstein and Freeman, 1990;Rajmaira and Ward, 1990;Goldstein, 1991Goldstein, , 1995Kinsella, 1994Kinsella, , 1995Oren 1994;Moore, 1995;Goldstein and Pevehouse, 1997;Rajmaira, 1997Rajmaira, , 1999.…”

Section: Perspectives About the Dynamics Of History In World Politicsmentioning

confidence: 99%

Time Remembered: A Dynamic Model of Interstate Interaction

Crescenzi

Enterline

2001

Int Studies Q

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Over time, states form relationships. These relationships, mosaics of past interactions, provide political leaders with information about how states are likely to behave in the future. Although intuitive, this claim holds important implications for the manner in which we construct and evaluate empirically our expectations about interstate behavior. Empirical analyses of interstate relations implicitly assume that the units of analysis are independent. Theories of interstate interaction are often cast in the absence of historical context. In the following article we construct a dynamic model of interstate interaction that we believe will assist scholars in empirical and theoretical studies by incorporating a substantively interpretable historical component into their models of interstate relations. Our conceptual model includes both conflictual and cooperative components, and exhibits the basic properties of growth and decay that characterize dyadic relationships. In an empirical exposition, we derive a continuous measure of interstate conflict from the conflictual component of the model. We rely on Oneal and Russett's (1997) analysis of dyadic conflict for the period 1950-85 as a benchmark, and examine whether the inclusion of our measure of interstate conflict significantly improves our ability to predict militarized conflict. We find empirical support for this hypothesis, indicating that our continuous measure of interstate conflict significantly augments a well-known statistical model of dyadic militarized conflict.Our findings reinforce the assertion that historical processes in interstate relationships represent substantively important elements in models of interstate behavior rather than econometric nuisances.

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“…This article categorizes arms to show that there are important differences that are not accounted for with the traditional SIPRI TIV (for previous use see Kinsella 1994Kinsella , 1998Kinsella , 2002 or the WMEAT measure (for previous use see Blanton 1999Blanton , 2000Blanton , 2005 that quantitative analyses use to measure arms transfers (Moore 2012 is a notable exception). The TIV does not take into account the type of arms transferred, but the aggregate military volume in the form of a dollar amount of all weapon systems transferred.…”

Section: Existing Measures Of Arms Transfersmentioning

confidence: 99%

The role and capabilities of major weapon systems transferred between 1950 and 2010: Empirical examinations of an arms transfer data set

Johnson

2015

Defence and Peace Economics

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This version is available at https://strathprints.strath.ac.uk/52939/ Strathprints is designed to allow users to access the research output of the University of Strathclyde. Unless otherwise explicitly stated on the manuscript, Copyright © and Moral Rights for the papers on this site are retained by the individual authors and/or other copyright owners. Please check the manuscript for details of any other licences that may have been applied. You may not engage in further distribution of the material for any profitmaking activities or any commercial gain. You may freely distribute both the url (https://strathprints.strath.ac.uk/) and the content of this paper for research or private study, educational, or not-for-profit purposes without prior permission or charge.Any correspondence concerning this service should be sent to the The author received no funding from any grant-awarding body.The author has no conflicts of interests based on the direct applications of this research. 2 AbstractArms transfers provide exporters an avenue to provide security to other states while gaining economic benefits. Arms transfers provide importers an avenue to gain security without having to rely on alliances. Past research uses aggregate measures of the monetary or security value of major weapon system transfers without accounting for strategic differences in possible use in interstate and civil conflict. This article presents a data set on interstate transfers of major weapon systems between 1950 and 2010 building upon SIPRI's Arms Trade Register with several improvements. First, it disaggregates land weapons and air weapons into categories reflecting their strategic capabilities. Second, model level characteristics (e.g. age, speed, and range) are drawn from Jane's Defence sources. Additionally, the data set covers a larger range of time and states than previous data sets categorizing arms. To demonstrate the usefulness this article first presents summary statistics of the data set and then replicates Blanton (2005) to show that the effect of human rights and regime types on United States transfers differs across the categories of arms compared to alternative measures of arms transfers.

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Conflict in Context: Arms Transfers and Third World Rivalries during the Cold War

Cited by 54 publications

References 24 publications

Exporting the Bomb: Why States Provide Sensitive Nuclear Assistance

Exporting the Bomb: Why States Provide Sensitive Nuclear Assistance

Time Remembered: A Dynamic Model of Interstate Interaction

The role and capabilities of major weapon systems transferred between 1950 and 2010: Empirical examinations of an arms transfer data set

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