Conquest and Conflict: The Colonial Roots of Maoist Violence in India

Verghese, Ajay; Teitelbaum, Emmanuel

doi:10.1177/0032329218823120

Cited by 10 publications

(7 citation statements)

References 31 publications

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“…For example, founded in October 2006, the Naxal Management Division of the Ministry of Home Affairs (renamed as the ‘Left‐Wing Extremism Division’ in 2015) regularly collects and publishes district‐level data regarding the number, casualties, and material costs of Maoist incidents (Government of India, n.d.). 11 The Division also collects data on the unarmed activities of the Maoists, such as propaganda and recruitment across the country, including the districts where Maoists do not carry out armed attacks (Verghese & Teitelbaum, 2019). The Ministry of Home Affairs publicly updates the list of Naxal‐affected districts every year.…”

Section: Mechanisms Of Containing the Maoist Unrest Based On Mgnregamentioning

confidence: 99%

Does violent conflict affect the distribution of social welfare? Evidence from India's Mahatma Gandhi National Rural Employment Guarantee Act

2023

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What are the contentious political dynamics of the largest workfare program in the world, the Mahatma Gandhi National Rural Employment Guarantee Act (MGNREGA) of India? Combining quantitative analysis with a close reading of government documents and a survey of the existing literature, we suggest that the Indian government's counter‐insurgency strategy against the Maoist unrest is a significant dynamic shaping the distribution of MGNREGA benefits. In our empirical analysis, we examine the effect of Maoist incidents on household income due to MGNREGA by merging a nationally representative household survey (Indian Human Development Survey‐II) and a Maoist incidents dataset. Controlling for relevant household and district characteristics, we show that higher intensity of violent conflicts is associated with higher MGNREGA benefits. This result is robust to using a variety of alternative specifications and estimation methodologies.

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Section: Mechanisms Of Containing the Maoist Unrest Based On Mgnregamentioning

confidence: 99%

Does violent conflict affect the distribution of social welfare? Evidence from India's Mahatma Gandhi National Rural Employment Guarantee Act

2023

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“…How do these theories apply in rural India? Perhaps the best known story hinges on differences in colonial land tenure systems, which have been widely claimed to have shaped the development trajectories of modern India, with areas with landlord-centered systems having lower levels of state capacity, public goods provision, and economic activity (Banerjee & Iyer, 2005; Iversen et al, 2013; Mukherjee, 2018; Sarbahi, 2016; Verghese & Teitelbaum, 2019). The most common version of this story hinges on cooperation in lobbying or voting.…”

Section: Theoretical Frameworkmentioning

confidence: 99%

Historical Inequality at the Grassroots: Local Public Goods in an Indian District, 1905–2011

Lee

2023

Comparative Political Studies

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How do historical inequalities influence modern public goods provision? This paper analyses a new panel dataset of local public goods provision in a single North Indian district with observations at the village-decade level going back to 1905 and detailed information on colonial land tenure institutions and demographics. The presence of large colonial landowners is positively associated with rural public goods provision when the landlord was resident in the early 20th century and has a null effect when the landlord was an absentee. Villages inhabited or owned by upper castes had an advantage in the colonial and immediate post-independence eras, but not afterward. The results suggest that within unequal societies, economic and status inequalities can have positive effects on public goods provision when they link elites to extralocal decision-makers.

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“… See Chandra & Garcia-Ponce (2019) andVerghese & Teitelbaum (2019) for class-based or maoist violence in India.3 On the impact of riots on election results, seeIyer & Shrivastava (2018).4 Two notable exceptions areMitra & Ray (2014) andMitra & Ray (2019). These studies differ from this article in their argument and main dependent variable, which is the severity of riots, measured as casualties, rather than the incidence and frequency of riots.…”

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confidence: 92%

“… See Chandra and Garcia-Ponce, 2019;Verghese and Teitelbaum, 2019 for class based or Maoist violence in India.3 On the impact of riots on election results, seeIyer and Shrivastava, 2018. 4 Two notable exceptions areMitra and Ray (2014) andMitra and Ray (2019).…”

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Inequality, elections, and communal riots in India

Bulutgil

Prasad

2022

Journal of Peace Research

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How does inequality within and between ethno-religious groups influence the likelihood and frequency of communal riots? Using evidence from India, this article finds that low within-group and high between-group inequality dampens the likelihood and frequency of communal riots. Theoretically, the article suggests that the instrumental logic, which posits that ethnonationalist politicians use violence to stoke ethnic cleavages and mobilize support, best accounts for this finding. We argue that to be politically competitive, ethnonationalist politicians need their supporters to identify foremost with their ethnic identity. When inequality within groups is high and/or inequality between groups is low, citizens are less likely to focus on ethnicity as their primary identity. In such contexts, politicians may use communal riots to improve their electoral prospects by reinforcing the salience of ethnicity. Empirically, the article relies on a time-series cross-district analysis of inequality and Hindu–Muslim riots in India to test the instrumental argument against theoretical alternatives. To illustrate the causal logic, the article also uses the analysis of a communal riot that occurred in Muzaffarnagar, Uttar Pradesh. Analyzing three aspects of the riot – background conditions, timing, targets of propaganda – we evaluate the different predictions of the instrumental argument. The article concludes with the suggestion that communal riots are distinct from cases of mass violence – such as civil wars, genocide, and ethnic cleansing – and could be conceptualized, along with other types of small-scale political violence, as a separate class of events with their own internal logic.

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Conquest and Conflict: The Colonial Roots of Maoist Violence in India

Cited by 10 publications

References 31 publications

Does violent conflict affect the distribution of social welfare? Evidence from India's Mahatma Gandhi National Rural Employment Guarantee Act

Does violent conflict affect the distribution of social welfare? Evidence from India's Mahatma Gandhi National Rural Employment Guarantee Act

Historical Inequality at the Grassroots: Local Public Goods in an Indian District, 1905–2011

Inequality, elections, and communal riots in India

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