Context-Sensitive Ontologies for a Non-reductionist Cognitive Neuroscience

Dewhurst, Joe

doi:10.1080/24740500.2018.1552102

Cited by 4 publications

(2 citation statements)

References 16 publications

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“…In the present article, we have chosen to limit our analysis of research practices as they occur in the mainstream cognitive neuroscience literature. A similar analysis of neuroscientific research practices within 4E and ecological frameworks would be a rather different enterprise and is outside the scope of the current article (for examples of work in this tradition, see Gibson, 1966;Chiel and Beer, 1997;Barrett, 2011;van Orden et al, 2012;Dotov, 2014;Anderson, 2014;Kiverstein and Miller, 2015;de Wit et al, 2017;Hutto et al, 2017;Dewhurst, 2018;Bruineberg and Rietveld, 2019;de Wit and Withagen, 2019;van der Weel et al, 2019;Ryan and Gallagher, 2020;Raja, 2021;Raja and Anderson, 2021).…”

Section: Functional Brain Mapping As the Analysis Decomposition And L...mentioning

confidence: 99%

Context-sensitive computational mechanistic explanation in cognitive neuroscience

Wit

Matheson

2022

Front. Psychol.

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Mainstream cognitive neuroscience aims to build mechanistic explanations of behavior by mapping abilities described at the organismal level via the subpersonal level of computation onto specific brain networks. We provide an integrative review of these commitments and their mismatch with empirical research findings. Context-dependent neural tuning, neural reuse, degeneracy, plasticity, functional recovery, and the neural correlates of enculturated skills each show that there is a lack of stable mappings between organismal, computational, and neural levels of analysis. We furthermore highlight recent research suggesting that task context at the organismal level determines the dynamic parcellation of functional components at the neural level. Such instability prevents the establishment of specific computational descriptions of neural function, which remains a central goal of many brain mappers – including those who are sympathetic to the notion of many-to-many mappings between organismal and neural levels. This between-level instability presents a deep epistemological challenge and requires a reorientation of methodological and theoretical commitments within cognitive neuroscience. We demonstrate the need for change to brain mapping efforts in the face of instability if cognitive neuroscience is to maintain its central goal of constructing computational mechanistic explanations of behavior; we show that such explanations must be contextual at all levels.

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Section: Functional Brain Mapping As the Analysis Decomposition And L...mentioning

confidence: 99%

Context-sensitive computational mechanistic explanation in cognitive neuroscience

Wit

Matheson

2022

Front. Psychol.

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“…This could mean that the psychological constructs that these researchers are looking for and testing with their experiments are themselves shaped by the individualistic tendencies that shape those researchers' own folk psychologies. This problem has been recognised more broadly for neuroscience (Dewhurst 2017(Dewhurst , 2018Poldrack 2010) and there is plenty of research to be done to better understand the effect of folk-psychological trends on scientists' work. To take one toy example: if one believes in the strong domain specificity of neural regions, then the domains one may begin to look for may well be influenced by one's own folk-concepts of cognition.…”

Section: Scientists Are Folk Toomentioning

confidence: 99%

The impact of culture on mindreading

Lavelle

2019

Synthese

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The role of culture in shaping folk psychology and mindreading has been neglected in the philosophical literature. This paper shows that there are significant cultural differences in how psychological states are understood and used by (1) drawing on Spaulding's recent distinction between the 'goals' and 'methods' of mindreading (2018) to argue that the relations between these methods vary across cultures; and (2) arguing that differences in folk psychology cannot be dismissed as irrelevant to the cognitive architecture that facilitates our understanding of psychological states. The paper concludes that any good account of social cognition must have the conceptual resources to explain how culture affects our understanding of psychological states, and that this explanandum should not be an afterthought but instead a guiding feature for those accounts.

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Folk Psychological and Neurocognitive Ontologies

Dewhurst

2020

Studies in Brain and Mind

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Context-Sensitive Ontologies for a Non-reductionist Cognitive Neuroscience

Cited by 4 publications

References 16 publications

Context-sensitive computational mechanistic explanation in cognitive neuroscience

Context-sensitive computational mechanistic explanation in cognitive neuroscience

The impact of culture on mindreading

Folk Psychological and Neurocognitive Ontologies

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