Contraintes verticales: l'Approche principal-agent

Rey,; Tirole,

doi:10.2307/20075599

Cited by 3 publications

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“…La plupart des stratégies d'entreprise, qui n'altèrent pas le bien-être social, devront d'ailleurs être acceptées et même encouragées par les pouvoirs publics au niveau national (voir Rey-Tirole, 1986 ;Warren-Boulton, 1979 ;Williamson, 1975) car elles ont des effets qui rejoignent ceux recherchés par ceux-ci. Nous présenterons donc en premier lieu l'approche pour l'entreprise et analyserons ensuite les éléments nouveaux attachés au caractère national de la stratégie.…”

Section: L'aspect Stratégique Du Conceptunclassified

Filières de production : revue de la littérature et comparaison avec la théorie néo-classique

Sekkat

1987

L'Actualité économique

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Tous droits réservés © HEC Montréal, 1987 Ce document est protégé par la loi sur le droit d'auteur. L'utilisation des services d'Érudit (y compris la reproduction) est assujettie à sa politique d'utilisation que vous pouvez consulter en ligne.https://apropos.erudit.org/fr/usagers/politique-dutilisation/ Cet article est diffusé et préservé par Érudit.Érudit est un consortium interuniversitaire sans but lucratif composé de

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Section: L'aspect Stratégique Du Conceptunclassified

Filières de production : revue de la littérature et comparaison avec la théorie néo-classique

Sekkat

1987

L'Actualité économique

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“…The quantity discounts (Jeuland and Shugan, 1983; Weng, 1995) are used in the manufacturer–retailer system, but discounts do not satisfy the retailer-bank-insurer system, because the firms sell different products, and, as a rule, the buyer acquires one unit of each products. The two-part-tariffs (Oi, 1971; Rey and Tirole, 1986; Moorthy, 1987) do not stimulate the firms to deviate from individual profit maximization. Consequently, the royalty payments are suitable for the retailer-bank-insurer system.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Pricing analysis of interconnected markets of housing, mortgage lending and insurance

Geraskin

2020

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Purpose This paper aims to investigate the problem of searching for the equilibrium in the housing market, the mortgage lending market and the insurance market in the process of selling the residential property. Three classes of markets are established in three modes, which reflect the interdependence of the firms’ interests in these markets through the parameters of their integration. The paper aims to determine the prices in these markets on the basis of the compromises among the conflicting interests of the related firms, and, in addition, to assess the rationality of integration for firms, which are participants in the process of selling the residential property. Design/methodology/approach On the basis of the revenue sharing contracts and the supply chain coordination methods, the optimization models of the housing realtor, the mortgage bank and the insurance company are developed. The models consider the interdependence of the firms’ interests, the monopolistic competition in these markets and the conditions of the firms’ individual rationality in the interaction process. Findings The results of the study are as follows. First, as a consequence of a decrease in the demand curves in monopolistic competition, the housing market, the mortgage market and the insurance market are interconnected, therefore, the optimization models of the firms in these markets are interdependent through the revenue sharing parameters. Second, in these markets the individual firms’ sales optimums are not identical, therefore, the interests of the firms are contradictory. Third, in the realtor-bank-insurer system, the equilibrium satisfies the condition of zero revenue sharing payments between the agents; additionally, the equilibrium prices in these markets are mutually independent. Fourth, in the disequilibrium, the prices in these markets are interrelated, i.e. the price in one market increases with the price in another market, if the payment is directed from the former to the latter, and vice versa. Research limitations/implications The results of the study are applicable in practice, if the markets demonstrate the decreasing demand curves and if the needs of buyers in related markets are interconnected. Practical implications The interaction between the realtor and the mortgage bank enables the realtor to raise its sales and the bank to increase in the number of loans, i.e. it leads to growth of their profits. The interaction between the insurer and the mortgage bank enables the insurer to increase in the number of policies and the bank to reduce the risk of lending, i.e. it leads to an increase in their profits. The identification of the individual firms’ sales optimums enables agents to determine the terms of the contracts of these interactions, which are compromises from the positions of each transaction participants. In addition, the firms’ optimums indicate the predictions of the equilibrium market prices. Originality/value In comparison with the studies in the contract theory framework, first, the mathematical description of the complicated (three-agent) system of interactions is proposed; second, the optimal choice non-linear models are developed, which take into account the non-linear demand functions in the monopolistic competition markets; third, the equilibrium of the agents with contradictory interests is investigated. In the later item, the authors establish that the revenue sharing contracts in the complimentary demands functions systems do not require the payments between the participants. Fourth, the authors prove that, in the equilibrium of these markets, the housing prices, the mortgage interest rates and the insurance rates are mutually independent and equal to the prices in the isolated markets.

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The reinterpretation of the agri-food system and its spatial dynamics through the industrial district

Sforzi¹,

Mancini²

2012

AGR ECON-CZECH

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Th e industrial district theory has brought to the development economics the opportunity to interpret the economic change through places, where it actually is formed, as a result of the join action of the local and extra-local social, economic and institutional forces. Th is paper sets out to discuss the contribution that the industrial district theory can make to the debate on the spatial dynamics of agri-food systems in the age of globalisation. To this end, the fi rst part of the paper analyses the contribution of the industrial district approach in the relationship between industry and territory; the second part studies the evolution of the concept of the agri-food system and the main determinants of the spatial dynamics in modern agri food systems. Th is paper supports that the industrial district theory can shed a new light on the spatial dynamics of agri-food systems, and can off er an alternative to the mainstream approach. In using the local community as a unit of analysis, the ID theory gives a key role to human agents of production and their knowledge and the agri-food system can be seen as 'a global network of places' , each place being specialized in a diff erent component of the system.

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Contraintes verticales: l'Approche principal-agent

Cited by 3 publications

References 0 publications

Filières de production : revue de la littérature et comparaison avec la théorie néo-classique

Filières de production : revue de la littérature et comparaison avec la théorie néo-classique

Pricing analysis of interconnected markets of housing, mortgage lending and insurance

The reinterpretation of the agri-food system and its spatial dynamics through the industrial district

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