Cooperation without Reputation: Experimental Evidence from Prisoner's Dilemma Games

Cooper, Russell; DeJong, Douglas V.; Forsythe, Robert; Ross, Thomas W.

doi:10.1006/game.1996.0013

Cited by 355 publications

(246 citation statements)

References 16 publications

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“…When playing with an unknown randomly selected stranger of the same sex as their partner, defection rates appear, unsurprisingly, higher at 57.5%. This rate of defection with strangers is very close to what was observed by Cooper et al (1996) at the beginning of their series of one-shot games. 13…”

Section: Prisoner's Dilemmasupporting

confidence: 84%

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Do spouses cooperate? An experimental investigation

2014

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ABSTRACT:In this paper we present results from an economic experiment with 100 co-habiting couples, to investigate behaviour in a prisoner's dilemma played by spouses. We compare defection behaviour within real couples to pairs of strangers. We observe that one out of four participants choose not to cooperate with their spouse. To understand why spouses might prefer defection, we use a novel allocation task to elicit the individual's trade-off between efficiency and equality within a couple. We further investigate the impact of socio-demographic and psychological characteristics of the couples. We find in particular that lack of preferences for joint income maximization; having children and being married lead to higher defection rates in the social dilemma.

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Section: Prisoner's Dilemmasupporting

confidence: 84%

“…15 Indeed it is not unusual to observe such an increase due to familiarization with the game (Cooper et al, 1996).…”

Section: [Table V]mentioning

confidence: 99%

Do spouses cooperate? An experimental investigation

2014

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“…They find significantly higher cooperation in the FRPDs compared to the one-shot games, as well as significantly higher cooperation in early rounds compared to later rounds. These patterns are consistent with the reputation-building theory of Kreps et al (1982) at an aggregate level, though in a similar FRPD experiment Cooper, DeJong, Forsythe, and Ross (1996) observe that, at the individual level, only 25% of subjects play consistently with reputation building. Cooper et al argue that the time path of play exhibits more cooperation than the Kreps et al model predicts and speculate that their findings could indicate reputation building if they were to consider alternative types of "irrational" players.…”

Section: Related Literaturesupporting

confidence: 81%

“…As Cooper et al (1996) press itself in data points scattered symmetrically about the 45-degree line. In both figures the 1S data is distributed in this manner.…”

Section: Individual-level Behaviormentioning

confidence: 98%

Revealed reputations in the finitely repeated prisoners’ dilemma

et al. 2015

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. (2015) 'Revealed reputations in the nitely-repeated prisoners' dilemma.', Economic theory., 58 (3). pp. 441-484. Further information on publisher's website:http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s00199-015-0863-1Publisher's copyright statement:The nal publication is available at Springer via http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s00199-015-0863-1. Additional information:Use policyThe full-text may be used and/or reproduced, and given to third parties in any format or medium, without prior permission or charge, for personal research or study, educational, or not-for-pro t purposes provided that:• a full bibliographic reference is made to the original source • a link is made to the metadata record in DRO • the full-text is not changed in any way The full-text must not be sold in any format or medium without the formal permission of the copyright holders.Please consult the full DRO policy for further details. Abstract In a sequential-move, finitely-repeated prisoners' dilemma game (FRPD), cooperation can be sustained if the first-mover believes her opponent might be a behavioral type who plays a tit-for-tat strategy in every period. We test this theory by revealing second-mover histories from an earlier FRPD experiment to their current opponent. Despite eliminating the possibility of reputation building, aggregate cooperation actually increases when histories are revealed. Cooperative histories lead to increased trust, but negative histories do not cause decreased trust. We develop a behavioral model to explain these findings.

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“…Roth (1988) provides a methodological overview of laboratory experimentation and investigated various types of experiments involving two person bargaining, prisoner's dilemma, auctioning behaviour and individual choice behaviour. Cooper et al (1996) investigates the theories of reputation building and altruism in one-shot and repeated games, and finds that neither fully explains the observed behaviour. Reputation building is inconsistent with both sets of evidence while altruism or warm glow models are unable to explain behaviour in repeated games.…”

Section: Background To the Competition Between Citiesmentioning

confidence: 99%

A game of two cities: A toll setting game with experimental results

Shepherd

Balijepalli

2015

Transport Policy

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In this paper we model the competition between two cities as a game to maximise the welfare considering the impact of demand management strategies in the form of cordon tolls. This research builds on earlier work which studied the competition in a small tolled network meant for private modes of transport which have a choice of route. The earlier work showed that while both cities have an incentive to charge alone, once they begin, they are likely to fall into the 'Nash Trap' of a prisoner's dilemma where the incentive to defect is higher than that to cooperate thus eventually leading to a 'lose-lose' situation. The current paper extends the idea of competition between cities by setting up a system dynamic model of two cities which includes modes such as car, bus, train and walking and cycling. This paper innovates by integrating the simulation of land use transport interactions with a class room style experimental game and analyses the gaming strategies from a continuous repeated prisoner's dilemma involving setting of tolls to maximise the welfare of residents. The aim is to test (a) whether the strategies adopted are as theory predicts and (b) whether the players recognise the benefits of lower tolls when given information about the regulated solution and collaborate or continue to play to win. The results show that players respond to the information and maintain a collaborative solution which may have significant implications for regulation and the development of cities within regional partnerships.

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Cooperation without Reputation: Experimental Evidence from Prisoner's Dilemma Games

Cited by 355 publications

References 16 publications

Do spouses cooperate? An experimental investigation

Do spouses cooperate? An experimental investigation

Revealed reputations in the finitely repeated prisoners’ dilemma

A game of two cities: A toll setting game with experimental results

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