Cooperative advertising, game theory and manufacturer–retailer supply chains

Li, Susan X.; Huang, Zhimin; Zhu, Joe; Chau, Patrick Y.K.

doi:10.1016/s0305-0483(02)00051-8

Cited by 184 publications

(82 citation statements)

References 16 publications

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“…As far as we were able to ascertain, the majority of publications that do exist are either conceptual (e.g. Cox, 1999;Watson, 1999;Cox et al, 2001;Li et al, 2002;Cox, 2004;Sucky, 2006;Crook and Combs, 2007;Muthusamy et al, 2008), or descriptive (e.g. Ogbonna and Wilkinson, 1998;Ireland, 1999;Watson, 2001).…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Knowledge acquisition in supply chain partnerships: The role of power

Ghobadian

Gallear

2013

International Journal of Production Economics

113

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Knowledge is recognised as an important source of competitive advantage and hence there has been increasing academic and practitioner interest in understanding and isolating the factors that contribute to effective knowledge transfer between supply chain actors. The literature identifies power as a salient contributor to the effective operation of a supply chain partnership. However, there is a paucity of empirical research examining how power among actors influences knowledge acquisition and in turn the performance of supply chain partners. The aim of this research is to address this gap by examining the relationship between power, knowledge acquisition and supply chain performance among the supply chain partners of a focal Chinese steel manufacturer. A structured survey was used to collect the necessary data.Two conceptually independent variables -'availability of alternatives' and 'restraint in the use of power' -were used to assess actual and realised power respectively. Controlling for contingencies, we found that the flow of knowledge increased when supply chain actors had limited alternatives and when the more powerful actor exercised restraint in the use of power.Moreover, we found a positive relationship between knowledge acquisition and supply chain performance. This paper enriches the literature by empirically extending our understanding of how power affects knowledge acquisition and performance.

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Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Knowledge acquisition in supply chain partnerships: The role of power

Ghobadian

Gallear

2013

International Journal of Production Economics

113

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“…Furthermore, it determines the manufacturer's share of local advertisement and the associated price level. Li et al (2002) developed three strategic models for determining the equilibrium marketing and investment effort levels for a manufacturer-retailer supply chain. They addressed the impact of brand name investments, local advertising, and sharing policy on co-op advertising programs.…”

Section: Literature Reviewmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…Yue et al (2006) studied the coordination of cooperative advertisement in a manufacturer-retailer supply chain when the manufacturer offers price deductions to customers. Li et al (2002) proposed three strategic models for determining equilibrium marketing and investment effort levels for a manufacturer and a retailer in two-members supply chain. In those models, they addressed the impact of brand name investments, local advertising, and sharing policy on cooperative advertising programs.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Production planning problem with market impact under demand uncertainty

Aoyama

Nishi

Zhang

2017

JAMDSM

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In this paper, we consider the production planning problem for a single manufacturer with the investment to improve the market impact under demand uncertainty. In the mathematical model, the average demand increases if the investment of market impact is increased for each product. The objective is to maximize the total profit with a piecewise linear investment cost and a budget constraint. The problem is formulated as a mixed integer nonlinear programming problem. A solution procedure based on Lagrangian relaxation is developed to solve the problem efficiently. In the proposed method, an analytical solution of the newsboy problem is effectively used to derive the lower and upper bounds. The condition of the concavity of the profit function is derived. The effectiveness of the proposed method is confirmed through computational experiments.

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“…A primary co-op advertising model was developed by Berger (1973). Chintagunta and Jain (1992), Li et al (2002), Karray and Zaccour (2005), Xie andNeyret (2009), SeyedEsfahani (2011), Zhang et al (2013), Liu et al (2014), Chaab and Rasti-Barzoki (2016) investigated cooperative advertising models from various perspectives such as static, dynamic, good will, reference price and so forth. For more detailed information, the interested readers are referred to Jørgensen and Zaccour (2014) who comprehensively reviewed cooperative advertising models.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Coordination of cooperative promotion efforts with competing retailers in a manufacturer-retailer supply chain

Johari¹,

Hosseini‐Motlagh²

2018

10.5267/j.uscm

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In this paper, the issue of cooperative (co-op) promotion efforts is addressed in a two-stage supply chain (SC). The investigated SC includes one monopolistic manufacturer and two duopolistic retailers facing different market demands. The customers' demand is affected by both advertising efforts of the manufacturer and two retailers. Moreover, the retailers compete with each other on local advertising investments within the market. In order to boost the retailers' advertising level, it is assumed that the manufacturer pays a ratio of the retailers' advertising expenditures. We propose four non-cooperative game scenarios and one cooperative game. Non-cooperative models are established through both Stackelberg and Nash game between two echelons. Moreover, both Cournot and Collusion behaviors are assumed to be followed by two retailers. We develop a promotion cost sharing contract to achieve the channel coordination. Under cooperation model, all SC members seek to reach the highest profit for the entire SC by considering the bargaining power of the SC participants. In each game scenario the optimal solution and unique equilibrium are determined. In addition, a comparison on the advertising level of all SC members along with the value of participation rate are provided. In addition, the feasibility of the cooperative game is discussed and resulted.

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Cooperative advertising, game theory and manufacturer–retailer supply chains

Cited by 184 publications

References 16 publications

Knowledge acquisition in supply chain partnerships: The role of power

Knowledge acquisition in supply chain partnerships: The role of power

Production planning problem with market impact under demand uncertainty

Coordination of cooperative promotion efforts with competing retailers in a manufacturer-retailer supply chain

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