Corporate environmentalism in a managerial delegation and abatement subsidy policy

Lee, Sang‐Ho; Park, Chul‐Hi

doi:10.1080/16081625.2019.1587302

Cited by 23 publications

(8 citation statements)

References 35 publications

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“…5 5 For example, Menezes and Pereira (2017) and Lee and Park (2021a, 2021b) showed that well‐designed government regulations take the forms of emission tax or green subsidy in environmental policies.…”

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confidence: 99%

“…8 8 Firms belonging to the G250 Fortune Index are generally characterized by the separation between ownership and control, which is delegated to managers; see Fershtman (1985) and Sklivas (1987) for the literature on the managerial delegation game. Recent studies on green managerial delegation propose the introduction of an environmental incentive into the managerial compensation scheme; see, for example, Hirose et al (2017, 2020), Lee and Park (2019, 2021b), Poyago‐Theotoky and Yong (2019), Buccella et al (2021), and Xu et al (2022). …”

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confidence: 99%

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Non‐cooperative and cooperative environmental corporate social responsibility with emission taxes

Lee

2022

Manage Decis Econ

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This study examines emission taxes and environmental corporate social responsibility (ECSR) under cooperative and non‐cooperative regimes, respectively, and compares Cournot and Bertrand competitions. We show that (i) there exists substitutability between emission taxes and ECSR, while the cooperative case always yields lower emission taxes and higher ECSR; (ii) environmental damage and social welfare are independent of types of ECSR under Cournot, but both are higher in the cooperative ECSR under Bertrand; and (iii) the cooperative ECSR cannot achieve socially desirable outcomes, whereas the non‐cooperative ECSR is beneficial to society under low marginal damage.

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Non‐cooperative and cooperative environmental corporate social responsibility with emission taxes

Lee

2022

Manage Decis Econ

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“…Recently, scholars have also analyzed environmental incentives concerning the managerial delegation model. For example, Liu et al (2015), Hirose et al (2017, 2020), and Lee and Park (2019, 2021) examined firms' voluntary initiatives toward abatement activities and emission reduction. Poyago‐Theotoky and Yong (2019), Buccella et al (2021, 2022, 2023), Xu et al (2022), and Xing and Lee (2023) further incorporated an emission tax policy and demonstrated theoretical linkages between environmental incentives and firm performance.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…Note that if

a = 0

, environmental incentives do not affect the consumers' WTP for green products, and thus, firms might not have interests in adopting environmental delegation in our model. Regarding the green managerial delegation model under an emission tax, see Lee and Park (2019, 2021), Poyago‐Theotoky and Yong (2019), Buccella et al (2021, 2023), Xu and Lee (2022), Xu et al (2022), Park and Lee (2023), and Xing and Lee (2023).…”

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Cournot–Bertrand comparisons under double managerial delegation contracts with sales and environmental incentives

Lee

2023

Manage Decis Econ

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This study investigates the effect of consumers' willingness to pay (WTP) for green products on double managerial delegation contracts with sales and environmental incentives. We illustrate that Cournot firms set higher sales and lower environmental incentives than Bertrand firms, yielding higher profits and better environmental performance under Cournot. We also examine an endogenous competition mode and discover that Cournot is an equilibrium when consumers' WTP is low, while the welfare‐inferior Bertrand appears unless consumers' WTP or product substitutability is high. Our finding suggests that antitrust authorities should monitor welfare‐distorting coordination when firms reformulate their strategies for emission‐reduction activities under double managerial delegation contracts.

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“…For studies on environmental responsibility, see Liu et al. (), Lee and Park (,b), Chen et al. (), and Nie and Wang ().…”

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Cooperation with a multiproduct corporation in a strategic managerial delegation

2019

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We consider an industry composed of a multiproduct corporation that adopts corporate social responsibility (CSR) as a strategic managerial delegation and examine the profit‐incentive to form a cooperative group. We find that competition is an equilibrium for any degree of substitutability and yields the highest CSR, which is increasing in the degree of substitutability. We also show that full cooperation is an equilibrium for lower substitutability but induces no CSR, whereas partial cooperation with one uniplant firm is an equilibrium for higher substitutability but yields lower CSR than that under competition. Therefore, cooperation might reduce strategic CSR activities, whereas competition will encourage higher CSR but yield lower industry profits.

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Corporate environmentalism in a managerial delegation and abatement subsidy policy

Cited by 23 publications

References 35 publications

Non‐cooperative and cooperative environmental corporate social responsibility with emission taxes

Non‐cooperative and cooperative environmental corporate social responsibility with emission taxes

Cournot–Bertrand comparisons under double managerial delegation contracts with sales and environmental incentives

Cooperation with a multiproduct corporation in a strategic managerial delegation

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