Corporate Social Responsibility Disclosures, Traditionalism and Politics: A Story from a Traditional Setting

Abstract

This paper demonstrates the political perspective of corporate social responsibility (CSR) disclosures and, drawing on Weber's notion of traditionalism, seeks to explain what motivates companies to make such disclosures in a traditional setting. Annual reports of 23 banking companies in Bangladesh are analysed over the period [2009][2010][2011][2012]. This is supplemented by a review of documentary evidence on the political and social activities of corporations and reports published in national and international newspapers. We found that, in the banking companies over the period of study, apparently neutral, corporate, philanthropic activities disclosed and promoted in CSR reports are inextricably linked to powerful leaders' personal projects and the ruling party's agendas. We have demonstrated elements of traditional societies, including personal loyalty and the public display of loyalty, the master-servant relationship, and obedience to personal rather than formal authority, provide an understanding of why banks (with or without explicit political linkages with the ruling party) have employed politically charged CSR disclosure strategies. The paper contributes to disclosure studies where political motivations of corporate disclosure rarely discussed. The paper extends the debate on political CSR by demonstrating that the role of family and familial values at the organisational and national levels may be much more important when it comes to CSR disclosure and activities.

Board Directors’ Expertise and Corporate Corruption Disclosure: The Moderating Role of Political Connections

“…Politicians on the board of a company in a country that has a looser grip on corruption, are more motivated by the political benefits of their role than inclusive development of the stakeholders. Uddin et al [6] have shown how, in a highly corrupt country, political management is sought for two main reasons: implementing the ruling political party's agenda and personal benefits derived by powerful managers. Moreover, Muttakin et al [4] have posited that, in a weak institution, family-led politics, the absence of the rule of law and highly corrupt national political management eschew disclosure practices due to limited stakeholder pressure and social legitimacy.…”

“…Recent research in developing countries has extensively focused on corporate social responsibility (CSR), corporate environmental responsibility (CER) and corporate carbon (CC) disclosures within the broad range of sustainability management disclosures (SMD) [1][2][3][4][5][6][7]. Furthermore, the number of studies continues to grow, in the context of both developed and developing countries [8][9][10][11][12][13][14][15][16].…”

“…Moreover, our discussion is particularly relevant when considering that the study is in relation to Bangladesh, a developing economy that is currently facing severe allegations regarding corruption. Thus far, only Azim and Kluvers [44] have offered a descriptive study on micro-credit banks' (Grameen banks) corruption-prevention mechanisms, while Uddin et al [6] offer an assessment of political CSR, and Muttakin et al [4] study the political connections and CSR disclosure in the Bangladeshi context. The dearth of corporate-level studies on this most critical issue makes us question how external experts (from accounting, law and politics) in the country are promoting corporate corruption disclosure at the business management level.…”

Toward a political economy of corporate governance change and stability in family business groups

“…We build on the seminal writings of contemporary British sociologist, Margaret S. Archer (1995), according to whom social reality depends on human doings and their desired or undesired consequences. This approach is operationalised through an empirical study of family BGs in Bangladesh, a country characterised by a weak capital market, lack of institutional development, corruption, family kleptocracy, weak state power and family-business nexus (Uddin et al, 2016;Sobhan, 2016). Our privileged access and 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31 32 33 34 35 36 37 38 39 40 41 42 43 44 45 46 47 48 49 50 51 52 53 54 55 56 57 58 59 60 c c o u n…”

Corporate diplomacy and political CSR: Similarities, differences and theoretical implications

“…In contrast to these idealistic perspectives on PCSR, another research stream views PCSR as a corporate political strategy that is aimed primarily at gaining business advantages and avoiding unfavorable regulations (Edward & Willmott, 2008;Fooks, Gilmore, Collin, Holden, & Lee, 2013;Shirodkar, Beddewela, & Richter, 2016). As such, literature describes PCSR as extended corporate citizenship aimed towards the generation of financial returns for shareholders (Djelic & Etchanchu, 2017;Uddin, Siddiqui, & Islam, 2016;Whelan, 2012). Moreover, within this perspective, PCSR can be defined as the "activities where CSR has an intended or unintended political impact, or where intended or unintended political impacts on CSR exist" (Frynas & Stephens, 2015, p. 485).…”