Counter-current flow in a vertical to horizontal tube with obstructions

Tye, P.; Matuszkiewicz, A.; Teyssedou, A.

doi:10.2172/107024

Cited by 1 publication

(2 citation statements)

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“…For example, the representationalist Michael Tye says of the face/vase ambiguous figure: a distinction can be drawn between the phenomenal character of the experiences one undergoes when one sees the figure below as two faces and the experience one has when one sees it as a vase. 22 Similarly, Alan Millar claims:…”

Section: Ambiguous Figures and Changes In Phenomenal Charactermentioning

confidence: 99%

“…Still, the concepts do not enter into the content of the sensory representations and they are not themselves phenomenally relevant. 29 Therefore, the difference in phenomenal character when seeing the picture as a duck and seeing it as a rabbit may be due to different nonconceptual states being tokened, even if such states are caused by the conceptual abilities of the subject of those states.…”

Section: Ambiguous Figures: a Preliminary Challengementioning

confidence: 99%

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Ambiguous Figures and the Content of Experience

Macpherson

2006

Nous

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Representationalism is the position that the phenomenal character of an experience is either identical with, or supervenes on, the content of that experience. Many representationalists hold that the relevant content of experience is nonconceptual. I propose a counter-example to this form of representationalism that arises from the phenomenon of Gestalt switching, which occurs when viewing ambiguous figures. First, I argue that one does not need to appeal to the conceptual content of experience or to judgements to account for Gestalt switching. I then argue that experiences of certain ambiguous figures are problematic because they have different phenomenal characters but that no difference in the nonconceptual content of these experiences can be identified. I consider three solutions to this problem that have been proposed by both philosophers and psychologists and conclude that none can account for all the ambiguous figures that pose the problem. I conclude that the onus is on representationalists to specify the relevant difference in content or to abandon their position.

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Section: Ambiguous Figures and Changes In Phenomenal Charactermentioning

confidence: 99%

Section: Ambiguous Figures: a Preliminary Challengementioning

confidence: 99%