Counterlogicals as Counterconventionals

Abstract

We develop and defend a new approach to counterlogicals. Non-vacuous counterlogicals, we argue, fall within a broader class of counterfactuals known as counterconventionals. Existing semantics for counterconventionals (developed by Einheuser (2006) and Kocurek et al. (2020)) allow counterfactuals to shift the interpretation of predicates and relations. We extend these theories to counterlogicals by allowing counterfactuals to shift the interpretation of logical vocabulary. This yields an elegant semantics for counterlogicals that avoids problems with the usual impossible worlds semantics. We conclude by showing how this approach can be extended to counterpossibles more generally.

Counterpossibles

“…Alternatively, one may impose constraints on closeness to generate a nontrivial logic for counterfactuals (Berto et al., 2018). Finally, epistemic and counterconventional nonvacuists could, in theory, maintain a nontrivial logic for counterfactuals on some readings while rejecting a nontrivial logic on others (Kocurek & Jerzak, 2021).…”

“…A final area of exploration I will mention concerns whether there are any interesting differences between different types of counterpossibles. For example, nonvacuists disagree over whether counterlogicals are a special class of vacuous counterpossibles (Kocurek & Jerzak, 2021, p. 677). Perhaps the same goes for counteranalyticals, but matters are less clear for countermathematicals and counterconceptuals.…”

“…Kocurek and Jerzak (2021) argue that counter(meta)logicals are vacuous on their countersubstratum reading. For example, assuming classical logic is correct, (15) is a counter(meta)logical.…”

“…9 9 For more on how to implement this idea formally, see Berto et al. (2018), Brogaard and Salerno (2013), and Kocurek and Jerzak (2021). …”

“…But it's no mystery how we could have knowledge of counterpossibles on their epistemic reading, since this is the reading that is relevantly tied to our epistemic state. As for counterconventional nonvacuists, there is some hope that one might be able to reduce our ability to know counterpossibles to a more general ability to reason about alternative conventions or conceptual schemes (Kocurek & Jerzak, 2021, Section 7). More generally, we might try to reduce our ability to know counterpossibles to our general capacity to imagine the impossible (Kung, 2010, 2016).…”