Credit Growth and Economic Recovery in Europe After the Global Financial Crisis

Antoshin, Sergei; Arena, Marco; Gueorguiev, Nikolay; Lybek, Tonny; Ralyea, John; Yehoue, Étienne B.

doi:10.5089/9781484329610.001

Cited by 15 publications

(22 citation statements)

References 56 publications

Supporting

Mentioning

Contrasting

Order By: Relevance

“…This double dip in agriculture investment is also observed at the level of aggregate EU output, and it has raised concerns over the ability of the EU economy to recover (Antoshin et al, 2017). In fact, Antoshin et al (2017) argues that the recovery has been weaker in Europe due to the double-dip recession. The authors suggest that credit constraints could be held, also, responsible for the sluggish EU recovery.…”

Section: Data On Agriculture Investment In Eu-14mentioning

confidence: 99%

“…This study comes in a timely manner as ten years after the financial crisis the economic recovery in EU is still rather anaemic. Antoshin et al (2017) report that the EU recovery is sluggish at best, mainly due to the observed double dip recession in many of the EU Member States in the last decade. The authors argue that bank lending and credit constraints are responsible for the observed slow EU recovery.…”

mentioning

confidence: 99%

See 1 more Smart Citation

Testing for the effects of credit crunch on agriculture investment in the EU

Mamatzakis

Staikouras

2020

Bulletin of Econ Res

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

There are several research papers focusing on the detrimental effects of the credit crunch on the economic performance. A sector of the economy where the implications of the credit crunch have not been thoroughly studied is the agriculture. This is surprising given the importance of agriculture for the European economy. We focus on agriculture in fourteen European Union (EU) Member States in the aftermath of the credit crunch. To this end, we employ the micro-econometric data set of Farm Accountancy Data Network (FADN) of EU at NUTS 2 level. From a methodological point of view, we model agriculture investment based on a flexible panel Vector Autoregressive (VAR) model that provides impulse response functions (IRFs) and variance decompositions (VDCs). The empirical estimates indicate that agriculture investment has been constrained by negative shocks in interest paid and total liabilities. Unless those financial constraints are eased, agriculture investment in EU would remain rather sluggish at best.

show abstract

Section: Data On Agriculture Investment In Eu-14mentioning

confidence: 99%

mentioning

confidence: 99%

Testing for the effects of credit crunch on agriculture investment in the EU

Mamatzakis

Staikouras

2020

Bulletin of Econ Res

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

show abstract

“…, capturing the impact of bank credit on the real economy. There are not many estimates for it available in the literature Antoshin et al (2017). find for 39 European countries a 10…”

mentioning

confidence: 99%

Going Fiscal? A Stylised Model With Fiscal Capacity and a Eurobond in the Eurozone

Codogno

Noord

2020

SSRN Journal

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

The paper shows that the introduction a Eurobond together with fiscal capacity at the centre would produce macro-stabilisation benefits both for the core and periphery of the Eurozone and would also achieve a rebalancing of the policy mix away from monetary towards fiscal stimulus. To demonstrate these benefits, we trace the shock-responses in a stylised model of the economy of the Eurozone with a core and a peripher to see how it would behave under alternative conditions. Alongside standard demand and supply shocks, we include financial risk-premium shocks by explicitly modelling bond yields, bank lending and public debt dynamics. We replace national bonds with Eurobonds on banks and ECB s balance sheets, and we introduce fiscal capacit at the centre with the power to adjust the aggregate fiscal stance. We conclude that had a Eurobond/fiscal capacity existed at the onset of the Great Financial Crisis, the recession would have been much more muted, and with much less need for unconventional monetary policy. Comments on an earlier version of this paper received at a seminar organised by ACES on 21 st January 2020 are gratefully acknowledged. The authors take full responsibility for all remaining errors and omissions.

show abstract

“…In the cross-country paper, this analysis is performed by John Ralyea (EUR). For details on the data and methodology, seeAntoshin et al (2017).©International Monetary Fund. Not for Redistribution…”

mentioning

confidence: 99%

“…found that about 25 percent of all recoveries are creditless, but that this share increased to 45 percent after the GFC.Bodnár et al (2014) found that between a quarter and a fifth of recoveries were creditless and real growth was permanently lower in these cases.14 Unfortunately, the credit impulse could not be calculated on transaction data due to data limitations.15 In the cross-country paper, this analysis is performed by Etienne Yehoue. For details on the data and methodology, seeAntoshin et al (2017).…”

mentioning

confidence: 99%