Crisis Initiation and Misperception

Abstract

This paper applies a theory-of-moves game model to analyze the effects of misperception on crisis initiation. The analysis indicates that the effects of misperception on initiation vary across player types and their level of dissatisfaction with the status quo: the initiation behavior of hard-line and middle-line players is adversely affected - they initiate crises they would otherwise avoid - at low and moderate levels of dissatisfaction, but not at high levels, where dissatisfaction is a sufficient condition for initiation; softline initiators, on the other hand, are nearly always adversely affected. Misperception may also result in noninitiation, which may be detrimental to satisfied players who wish to protect the status quo but beneficent to would-be targets. These conclusions, which support prior game-theoretic work, have important implications for deterrence and crisis-prevention strategies.

Hareketler Teorisi Klasik Oyun Teorisinin Sağlayamadığı Neyi Sağlıyor? Hareketler Teorisinin Metodolojik Araçları Üzerine Bir Çalışma

“…TOM has been used by several scholars to make analyses in international politics (Brams, 2000;Brams, 1993;Brams and Hessel, 1984;Brams and Togman, 1996;Zeagar and Bascom, 1996;Mor, 1995;Simon, 1995;Kiryluk-Dryjska, 2016). In these analyses, in accordance with the theoretical presumptions of GT, the strategic interactions among states, social movements, regional actors, and terrorist organizations are investigated.…”

Learning and the Evolution of Enduring International Rivalries: a Strategic Approach

“…Applications of this approach included studies of nuclear deterrence and crisis bargaining (Morrow 1989;Powell 1990;Wagner 1989). Second, the theory of moves (TOM) extends the rules of classical game theory to define sequential play within fixed-matrix games (Brams 1994Brams and Mattli 1993;Brams and Mor 1993;Mor 1995). Maoz (1990b, 464-530) discussed two general explanations of long-term international processes.…”

“…39 "Enduring rivalries are those conflicts between the same two states that involve at least five militarized disputes in a period lasting at least ten years" (p. 5). 40 For an analysis of the effects of misperception on crisis initiation by nonmyopic players, see Mor (1995). 41 The table includes only interactions that require more than one round to converge.…”

Emotion in Group Decision and Negotiation

“…Here I am concerned with emotions that arise in interpersonal situations rather than "existential"(Lazarus and Bernice 1994, pp. The latter, which concern the way we see ourselves, are often independent of the actions of others in a game (though not in Macbeth, as discussed later).4 For other applications of the theory of moves, seeBrams and Mor (1993),Mor (1993Mor ( , 1995,Colomer (1995a, b),Maoz and Mor (1996),Brams and Togman (1996),Simon (1996),Lax (1996),Massoud (1998), and Brams (1997b). The latter, which concern the way we see ourselves, are often independent of the actions of others in a game (though not in Macbeth, as discussed later).4 For other applications of the theory of moves, seeBrams and Mor (1993),Mor (1993Mor ( , 1995,Colomer (1995a, b),Maoz and Mor (1996),Brams and Togman (1996),Simon (1996),Lax (1996),Massoud (1998), and Brams (1997b).…”