Criteria of identity without sortals

Mooney, Justin

doi:10.1111/nous.12419

Cited by 4 publications

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“…6-7), Schwartz (2009, pp. 613-615), and Mooney (2021, 2022, and it is suggested in passing by Markosian (2010, p. 144). See also Price (1977) and Tichý (2004Tichý ( [1987, pp.…”

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The Matter of Coincidence

Mooney

2023

Pacific Philosophical Qtr

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The phasalist solution to the puzzle of the statue and the piece of clay claims that being a statue is a phase sortal property of the piece of clay, just like being a child is a phase sortal property of a human being. Some philosophers reject this solution because it cannot account for cases where the statue seems to gain and lose parts that the piece of clay does not. I rebut this objection by arguing, contrary to the prevailing view, that the piece of clay is not mereologically constant and might even be highly mereologically flexible.

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“…6-7), Schwartz (2009, pp. 613-615), and Mooney (2021, 2022, and it is suggested in passing by Markosian (2010, p. 144). See also Price (1977) and Tichý (2004Tichý ( [1987, pp.…”

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“…17 This point has been made by, for example, Wiggins (2001, p. 64). 18 See Ayers (1974), Price (1977), and Mooney (2021Mooney ( , 2022.…”

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The Matter of Coincidence

Mooney

2023

Pacific Philosophical Qtr

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Ordinary undetached parts

Mooney

2023

Synthese

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Undetached PartsHere's a puzzle that continues to tease metaphysicians. 1 Dion is a human being and Theon is his left-foot-complement, i.e., that proper part of Dion which is composed of the atoms that compose Dion except for those which overlap his left foot. We know that Dion is distinct from Theon, since they have different properties. For example, Dion has two feet but Theon has one. But suppose Dion's left foot is cut off and destroyed. Dion seems to survive this ordeal, since a person can survive losing a minor part such as a foot. Theon seems to survive too, since it would be strange for Theon to 1 The puzzle can be traced back as far as Philo of Alexandria and Chryssipus (Sedley 1982; Long & Sedley 1987: 171-172). A version of it also appears in William of Sherwood (1968: 60-61). Another instance of the problem was introduced to the literature by Wiggins (1968), who -perhaps mistakenly -took it to be a version of the puzzle due to Geach (1980: §110) which is now known as the problem of the many. 2 be destroyed by a mere extrinsic change, viz., ceasing to be attached to a foot. But with Dion's left foot gone, Dion and Theon are now in exactly the same place at exactly the same time, and they seem to be composed of all the same atoms. In short, they seem to be coincident. When numerically distinct objects are coincident, I will say that they are co-located. Since Dion and Theon are distinct, it follows that, if they are coincident, then they are also co-located. Unfortunately, the idea that material objects can be colocated does not sit well with common intuitions.This problem has spawned a wide array of creative and interesting solutions. 2 Simons (1987) observes that it "brings together a number of crucial ontological issues, and has elicited the most varied responses. It is almost a touchstone for finding out important facts about a philosopher's ontology" (118). One solution, which I will call the conservative solution, distinguishes between ordinary and extraordinary undetached parts.Ordinary undetached parts are parts which are recognized in folk metaphysics, and extraordinary undetached parts are parts which are not recognized in folk metaphysics. (I will have something to say about the vagueness of this distinction in Section 2.) The conservative solution claims that only ordinary undetached parts exist. 3 Theon's existence is then denied on the grounds that Theon is an extraordinary undetached part, not an ordinary one, and this dissolves the puzzle. After all, there is no reason to worry that Dion is coincident with Theon if Theon doesn't exist. An important objection to the conservative solution is that it doesn't generalize 2 Various solutions are defended by Wiggins (1968);

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Identity

Shumener

2022

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Identity criteria are powerful tools for the metaphysician. They tell us when items are identical or distinct. Some varieties of identity criteria also try to explain in virtue of what items are identical or distinct. This Element has two objectives: to discuss formulations of identity criteria and to take a closer look at one notorious criterion of object identity, Leibniz's Law. The first section concerns the form of identity criteria. The second section concerns the better-regarded half of Leibniz's Law, the indiscernibility of identicals. The third section turns to the more controversial half of Leibniz's Law, the identity of indiscernibles. The author considers alternatives to Leibniz's Law as well as the possibility that there are no adequate identity criteria to be found.

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Criteria of identity without sortals

Cited by 4 publications

References 57 publications

The Matter of Coincidence

The Matter of Coincidence

Ordinary undetached parts

Identity

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