Cryptanalysis of an EPC Class-1 Generation-2 standard compliant authentication protocol

Peris-López, Pedro; Hernández-Castro, Julio; Tapiador, Juan E.; Lubbe, J.C.A. van der

doi:10.1016/j.engappai.2011.04.001

Cited by 24 publications

(19 citation statements)

References 28 publications

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“…However, there are many reports on their vulnerabilities [23,43,25,30,21,26,29]. The current work falls in the same line where we study the protocol proposed by Wei et al [36] and show vulnerabilities in the proposal.…”

Section: Standards For Rfid Protocolsmentioning

confidence: 82%

On the Security of Mutual Authentication Protocols for RFID Systems: The Case of Wei et al.’s Protocol

Safkhani

Bagheri

Sanadhya

et al. 2012

Data Privacy Management and Autonomous Spontaneus Security

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Abstract. Authentication is one of the most basic and important cryptographic tasks. Mutual authentication protocols play a crucial role on the security of RFID systems. In this paper, we consider the security of a recently proposed mutual authentication protocol by Wei et al. which is a hash based protocol. We present efficient tag impersonation attack, two desynchronization attacks, reader impersonation attack and traceability attack against this protocol. The success probabilities of the attacks are "1" or 1 − 2 −(n−1) , where n is the length of the secret value shared between the tag and the reader. The complexity of each one of the presented attacks is only two runs of protocol. Vulnerabilities presented in the present work rule out the practical usage of this protocol. To the best of our knowledge, this is the first security analysis of Wei et al.'s protocol. Finally, we exhibit an improved version of this protocol, which is immune against the attacks presented in this work.

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Section: Standards For Rfid Protocolsmentioning

confidence: 82%

On the Security of Mutual Authentication Protocols for RFID Systems: The Case of Wei et al.’s Protocol

Safkhani

Bagheri

Sanadhya

et al. 2012

Data Privacy Management and Autonomous Spontaneus Security

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“…Unfortunately, these attempts fall short of meeting the desired security objectives because EPC Class-1 Gen-2 supports only simple building blocks such as a 16-bit pseudorandom number generator and a 16-bit cyclic redundancy code. Many analysis papers (see, e.g., [34], [63], [57], [59]) show that it seems that enforcing privacy and security under the EPC Class-1 Gen-2 specifications is an almost impossible task due to the "bad" properties of the building blocks used.…”

Section: Building Blocksmentioning

confidence: 99%

Privacy-Friendly Authentication in RFID Systems: On Sublinear Protocols Based on Symmetric-Key Cryptography

Avoine¹,

Bingöl²,

Carpent³

et al. 2013

IEEE Trans. on Mobile Comput.

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The recent advent of ubiquitous technologies has raised an important concern for citizens: the need to protect their privacy. So far, this wish was not heard of industrials, but national and international regulation authorities, as the European Commission recently published some guidelines to enforce customers' privacy in RFID systems: "Privacy by design" is the way to be followed as stated in EC Recommendation of 12.5.2009. Research on privacy is an active domain but there is still a wide gap between theory and everyday life's applications. Filling this gap will require academia to design protocols and algorithms that fit the real-life constraints. In this paper, we provide a comprehensive analysis of privacy-friendly authentication protocols devoted to RFID that: 1) are based on well-established symmetric-key cryptographic building blocks; 2) require a reader complexity lower than OðNÞ where N is the number of provers in the system. These two properties are sine qua non conditions for deploying privacy-friendly authentication protocols in large-scale applications, for example, access control in mass transportation. We describe existing protocols fulfilling these requirements and point out their drawbacks and weaknesses. We especially introduce attacks on CHT, CTI,YA-TRAP*, and the variant of OSK/AO with mutual authentication. We also raise that some protocols, such as O-RAP, O-FRAP, and OSK/BF, are not resistant to timing attacks. Finally, we select some candidates that are, according to our criteria, the most appropriate ones for practical uses.

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“…The authors in [20] proposed a new protocol called Azumi to overcome the security flaws of [21] and claim that it is capable of defending against location tracking, DoS attacks, counterfeit reader or tag, and man-in-the-middle (MitM) attacks. However, it is shown that the work in [20] is vulnerable to tag impersonation and secret disclosure attacks.…”

Section: A Related Workmentioning

confidence: 99%

EPC Gen2v2 RFID Standard Authentication and Ownership Management Protocol

Niu

Taqieddin

Jagannathan

2016

IEEE Trans. on Mobile Comput.

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Cryptanalysis of an EPC Class-1 Generation-2 standard compliant authentication protocol

Cited by 24 publications

References 28 publications

On the Security of Mutual Authentication Protocols for RFID Systems: The Case of Wei et al.’s Protocol

On the Security of Mutual Authentication Protocols for RFID Systems: The Case of Wei et al.’s Protocol

Privacy-Friendly Authentication in RFID Systems: On Sublinear Protocols Based on Symmetric-Key Cryptography

EPC Gen2v2 RFID Standard Authentication and Ownership Management Protocol

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