2020
DOI: 10.26226/morressier.5f0c7d3058e581e69b05d017
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Customer RPE: Using Customer Performance to Filter Noise out of CEO Incentive Contracts.

Abstract: and Executive Compensation and Corporate Governance Brownbag Series for helpful comments on an earlier version of this paper. We acknowledge the financial support of Emory University and Boston College.

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