Cyber-Physical Security: A Game Theory Model of Humans Interacting Over Control Systems

Backhaus, Scott; Bent, Russell; Bono, James; Lee, Ritchie; Tracey, Brendan D.; Wolpert, David H.; Xie, Dongping; Yıldız, Yıldıray

doi:10.1109/tsg.2013.2270291

Cited by 67 publications

(27 citation statements)

References 21 publications

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“…For example, some research efforts focus on applying game theory to network security and security in a variety of systems [38,39,40,41,42,43,44,45,46,47,48,49,50]. For example, Xiao et al [41] investigated an indirect reciprocity security game for mobile wireless networks.…”

Section: Related Workmentioning

confidence: 99%

Towards an Iterated Game Model with Multiple Adversaries in Smart-World Systems

Yang

et al. 2018

Sensors

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Diverse and varied cyber-attacks challenge the operation of the smart-world system that is supported by Internet-of-Things (IoT) (smart cities, smart grid, smart transportation, etc.) and must be carefully and thoughtfully addressed before widespread adoption of the smart-world system can be fully realized. Although a number of research efforts have been devoted to defending against these threats, a majority of existing schemes focus on the development of a specific defensive strategy to deal with specific, often singular threats. In this paper, we address the issue of coalitional attacks, which can be launched by multiple adversaries cooperatively against the smart-world system such as smart cities. Particularly, we propose a game-theory based model to capture the interaction among multiple adversaries, and quantify the capacity of the defender based on the extended Iterated Public Goods Game (IPGG) model. In the formalized game model, in each round of the attack, a participant can either cooperate by participating in the coalitional attack, or defect by standing aside. In our work, we consider the generic defensive strategy that has a probability to detect the coalitional attack. When the coalitional attack is detected, all participating adversaries are penalized. The expected payoff of each participant is derived through the equalizer strategy that provides participants with competitive benefits. The multiple adversaries with the collusive strategy are also considered. Via a combination of theoretical analysis and experimentation, our results show that no matter which strategies the adversaries choose (random strategy, win-stay-lose-shift strategy, or even the adaptive equalizer strategy), our formalized game model is capable of enabling the defender to greatly reduce the maximum value of the expected average payoff to the adversaries via provisioning sufficient defensive resources, which is reflected by setting a proper penalty factor against the adversaries. In addition, we extend our game model and analyze the extortion strategy, which can enable one participant to obtain more payoff by extorting his/her opponents. The evaluation results show that the defender can combat this strategy by encouraging competition among the adversaries, and significantly suppress the total payoff of the adversaries via setting the proper penalty factor.

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Section: Related Workmentioning

confidence: 99%

Towards an Iterated Game Model with Multiple Adversaries in Smart-World Systems

Yang

et al. 2018

Sensors

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“…Essentially, a cyber-physical system [6]- [8] is any system that is composed of cyber elements, such as communication nodes, and physical elements that follow the laws of physics, such as any control system. In particular, the power grid is a complex cyber-physical system whose cyber elements, such as SCADA components, depend on the power supply of the physical system, such as generators, while the physical system relies on the cyber system for operation, monitoring and control.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Stochastic Games for Power Grid Protection Against Coordinated Cyber-Physical Attacks

Wei

Sarwat

Saad

et al. 2018

IEEE Trans. Smart Grid

133

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Owing to the critical nature of the power grid, coordinated cyber-physical attacks on its critical infrastructure can lead to disastrous human and economic losses. In this paper, a stochastic game-theoretic approach is proposed to analyze the optimal strategies that a power grid defender can adopt to protect the grid against coordinated attacks. First, an optimal load shedding technology is devised to quantify the physical impacts of coordinated attacks. Taking these quantified impacts as input parameters, the interactions between a malicious attacker and the defender are modeled using a resource allocation stochastic game. The game is shown to admit a Nash equilibrium and a novel learning algorithm is introduced to enable the two players to reach such equilibrium strategies while maximizing their respective minimum rewards in a sequence of stages. The convergence of the proposed algorithm to a Nash equilibrium point is proved and its properties are studied. Simulation results of the stochastic game model on the WSCC 9-bus system and the IEEE 118-bus system are contrasted with those of static games, and show that different defense resources owned lead to different defense strategies.Index Terms-Coordinated attacks, optimal load shedding, power grid security, stochastic game theory.

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“…Thus, knowing how to deal with the cyber security issues of smart grids has become a new challenge. Some basic guidelines for cyber security have been published [7,8] and some studies on the cyber security of power control systems have been carried out in the past few years [9][10][11][12][13][14]. The existence of exploitable vulnerabilities is the precondition for cyber-attacks.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Quantitative Vulnerability Assessment of Cyber Security for Distribution Automation Systems

Zhao

Zhang

et al. 2015

Energies

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Abstract:The distribution automation system (DAS) is vulnerable to cyber-attacks due to the widespread use of terminal devices and standard communication protocols. On account of the cost of defense, it is impossible to ensure the security of every device in the DAS. Given this background, a novel quantitative vulnerability assessment model of cyber security for DAS is developed in this paper. In the assessment model, the potential physical consequences of cyber-attacks are analyzed from two levels: terminal device level and control center server level. Then, the attack process is modeled based on game theory and the relationships among different vulnerabilities are analyzed by introducing a vulnerability adjacency matrix. Finally, the application process of the proposed methodology is illustrated through a case study based on bus 2 of the Roy Billinton Test System (RBTS). The results demonstrate the reasonability and effectiveness of the proposed methodology.

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Cyber-Physical Security: A Game Theory Model of Humans Interacting Over Control Systems

Cited by 67 publications

References 21 publications

Towards an Iterated Game Model with Multiple Adversaries in Smart-World Systems

Towards an Iterated Game Model with Multiple Adversaries in Smart-World Systems

Stochastic Games for Power Grid Protection Against Coordinated Cyber-Physical Attacks

Quantitative Vulnerability Assessment of Cyber Security for Distribution Automation Systems

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