Cyber–physical security for on‐going smart grid initiatives: a survey

Abstract

The smart grid is an upgraded concept of electricity network with tight coupling among information, control, and bidirectional communication technologies. Along with the silent features of the ongoing smart grid, cyber-physical security appears to be a deep concern due to its significant dependence on sensing technologies, complex networks of computers, intelligence, and wide-area communication infrastructures. Moreover, the smart grid is an extensive critical infrastructure and vulnerable to coordinated cyber-physical attacks. As a result, cyber-physical attacks cause significant threats to the confidentiality and integrity of the power data, including power outages, cascading failures, and unnecessary expenditure. In this study, security issues of smart grid, including cyber-physical interdependency, attack varieties, detection methods, requirements, standards, challenges, and future prospects, are taken into consideration for both cyber and physical systems, aiming to provide an extensive understanding of vulnerabilities and solutions for the smart power grid. By revealing the inherent features of cyber-physical security in the smart grid, this survey study is addressed to facilitate future research in these two areas.

Intelligent Buildings in Smart Grids: A Survey on Security and Privacy Issues Related to Energy Management

“…From this perspective, the impact of different kinds of attacks on the SG can be evaluated from both cyber and physical points of view, making it possible to select the most appropriate security solution to reduce the impact in each of the two parts [36]. Several authors have applied the CPS concept to production systems (cyber-physical production system-CPPS [37]) to improve their performance and their efficiency by introducing new types of sensors [38], collecting data, and supporting decision making through big data technologies, which can be associated with the implementation of Industry 4.0 technologies [39].…”

Overview and Improvement of Procedures and Practices of Electricity Transmission System Operators in South East Europe to Mitigate Cybersecurity Threats

“…Starting from the Slammer worm that infected the Davis-Besse nuclear power plant in Ohio in 2003 and affected its safety parameters display system [5], the number of cyberattacks on energy systems, including power systems, has increased [6]. These complex attacks were targeted and intended to sabotage the operation of energy utilities and cause disruption in their services.…”

“…The disruption of the services of power companies is the most significant effect, followed by the potential impact on human wellbeing and financial implications of undelivered electricity, the potential equipment damage, and the possibilities for cascading effects and spread on neighboring transmission systems. Some of these effects, which have been observed in past attacks on power systems, are discussed in [6,14]. The rising sense of insecurity and panic is the underlying element of many cyber-attacks, but the effect of cyber-attacks on power systems is even greater as a huge number of people may be affected.…”

Toward Quantum Secured Distributed Energy Resources: Adoption of Post-Quantum Cryptography (PQC) and Quantum Key Distribution (QKD)

“…The DER network also connects DERMS to utilities to keep the entire system stable [4][5][6][7][8]. As the amount and importance of information transmitted and received in the DER network also increase, the interest and importance of DER network security also increases [4][5][6][7][8][9][10][11][12][13][14][15]. Many standards have been established for the security of DER networks [10,[16][17][18][19][20][21][22][23][24][25][26][27].…”