Cyber security threat analysis and modeling of an unmanned aerial vehicle system

Javaid, Ahmad Y.; Sun, Weiqing; Devabhaktuni, Vijay; Alam, M. S.

doi:10.1109/ths.2012.6459914

Cited by 251 publications

(126 citation statements)

References 18 publications

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“…Similar to our work, they consider both the sensor components and the control units of the CPS, and demonstrate the approach by simulating a deception attack on the navigation system of a UAS. Javaid et al [17] also analyze cybersecurity threats for UAS. They simulate the effects of attacks that usually end in a crash, focusing on identifying different existing attack surfaces and vulnerabilities rather than focusing on runtime detection or post-attack analysis.…”

Section: Related Workmentioning

confidence: 99%

R2U2: monitoring and diagnosis of security threats for unmanned aerial systems

Moosbrugger

Rozier

Schumann

2017

Form Methods Syst Des

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We present R2U2, a novel framework for runtime monitoring of security properties and diagnosing of security threats on-board Unmanned Aerial Systems (UAS). R2U2, implemented in FPGA hardware, is a real-time, Realizable, Responsive, Unobtrusive Unit for runtime system analysis, now including security threat detection. R2U2 is designed to continuously monitor inputs from on-board components such as the GPS, the ground control station, other sensor readings, actuator outputs, and flight software status. By simultaneously monitoring and performing statistical reasoning, attack patterns and post-attack discrepancies in the UAS behavior can be detected. R2U2 uses runtime observer pairs for Linear and Metric Temporal Logics for property monitoring and Bayesian networks for diagnosis of system health during runtime. We discuss the design and implementation that now enables R2U2 to handle security threats and present simulation results of several attack scenarios on the NASA DragonEye UAS.

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Section: Related Workmentioning

confidence: 99%

R2U2: monitoring and diagnosis of security threats for unmanned aerial systems

Moosbrugger

Rozier

Schumann

2017

Form Methods Syst Des

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“…[32] presents a threat model of possible attacks on UAVs to assist designers with risk analysis. Attacks are categorized into Confidentiality, Integrity, or Availability, and then further separated by origin or location of attack.…”

Section: Securitymentioning

confidence: 99%

Safe and Secure Support for Public Safety Networks

Apvrille¹,

Li²

2017

Wireless Public Safety Networks 3

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SUMMARYThe advent of autonomous vehicles and UAVs offers additional support for disaster relief efforts. These self-managing objects are able to gather data, deploy a wireless network, and other simple routine maintenance tasks, freeing up aid workers to focus their efforts on the rescue itself. Fleets of UAVs may deploy mobile communication networks, and with their mobility advantage, also gather visual images of areas to coordinate relief efforts. Autonomous vehicles may deploy a higher-powered wireless relay, and also transport supplies or evacuate patients from treacherous areas without risking the life of a driver. However, during these precarious situations, faults in the design of these autonomous vehicles, should they be exposed and exploited, may worsen the disaster. It is important to ensure that these deployed autonomous objects will execute both safely and securely. In this chapter, we present a design methodology SysML-Sec in the open-source toolkit TTool for the design and verification of both autonomous objects and mission planning.

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“…Malware infection of on board computers [113] Hijacked control of locks, brakes and engine Malware detection [113] GPS Spoofing [50,117] Artificial traffic jam caused Signal analysis [51][52][53] Web-based immobilisation hijacked [114] Cars immobilised remotely and simultaneously Web security literature [46] GPS Spoofing [50,117] Unmanned vehicle redirected [117,118] Signal analysis [51][52][53] Gain-scheduling attack [117] Control stability affected [117] No known solutions…”

Section: Manned Vehiclesmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…In addition, they have analysed a gain-scheduling attack affecting the vehicle's controls and stability through sensor spoofing, and a fuzzing attack where the attacker injects random inputs to the vehicle's actuators [117]. In parallel, a less technical high-level analysis of the potential impact of cyber attacks on UAVs has been presented in [118]. It is important to note that a recent congressional report on unmanned aircraft systems has stated that vulnerabilities in the command and control of UAS operations are a primary obstacle to their integration in the national airspace system [119].…”

Section: Unmanned Vehiclesmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…Adam et al [70] x x x x x Al Ameen et al [102] x x x x x x Bakar et al [35] x x x x x x x Belala et al [126] x x x x x Bharania [32] x x x x x x x x Bouckaert [33] x x x x x Casoni and Paganelli [43] x x x x x x x x Chan et al [25] x x x x x x x x x Chow et al [101] x x x x Chu et al [48] x x x x x Clark et al [29] x x x x x De Cerchio and Riley [111] x x x x x DHS/FEMA [108] x x x x Gelenbe et al [41,44,86,87] x x x x x x x x x x x x Haji et al [36] x x x x x Hiltz and Gonzalez [48] x x x Jafarnia-Jahromi et al [51] x x x x x Jakobson [122] x x x x x x x x Javaid et al [118] x x x x x Kim et al [117] x x x x x Levin et al [39] x x x x x x Li et al [62] x x x x x Liu et al [26] x x x x x x x Malan et al [61] x x x x x x Michalas et al [80] x x x x x Mitchell et al [56,57] x x x x x x x Rafique et al [106] x x x Rao and Rao et al [55] x x x x x Storey [112] x x x Tran et al [38] x x x x x Walker et al [18,71] x x x x x x x x x Warner et al [52] x x x x x Zeng et al [53] x x x x…”

mentioning

confidence: 99%

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A Review of Cyber Threats and Defence Approaches in Emergency Management

2013

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Emergency planners, first responders and relief workers increasingly rely on computational and communication systems that support all aspects of emergency management, from mitigation and preparedness to response and recovery. Failure of these systems, whether accidental or because of malicious action, can have severe implications for emergency management. Accidental failures have been extensively documented in the past and significant effort has been put into the development and introduction of more resilient technologies. At the same time researchers have been raising concerns about the potential of cyber attacks to cause physical disasters or to maximise the impact of one by intentionally impeding the work of the emergency services. Here, we provide a review of current research on the cyber threats to communication, sensing, information management and vehicular technologies used in emergency management. We emphasise on open issues for research, which are the cyber threats that have the potential to affect emergency management severely and for which solutions have not yet been proposed in the literature.

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Cyber security threat analysis and modeling of an unmanned aerial vehicle system

Cited by 251 publications

References 18 publications

R2U2: monitoring and diagnosis of security threats for unmanned aerial systems

R2U2: monitoring and diagnosis of security threats for unmanned aerial systems

Safe and Secure Support for Public Safety Networks

A Review of Cyber Threats and Defence Approaches in Emergency Management

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