Decision Making in Green Supply Chain with Manufacturers’ Misreporting Behavior

Zong, Shengliang; Shen, Chunyang; Su, Siping

doi:10.3390/su14094957

Cited by 3 publications

(2 citation statements)

References 62 publications

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“…The manufacturer was responsible for the green R&D costs and the recycling investment; at the same time, the retailer was responsible for the investment in the sales effort. Zong et al [22] found that some manufacturers tend to misreport the green degree of their products to reduce the cost of energy conservation and emission reduction. They studied the impacts of misreporting behavior on the green supply chain performance and find that it would reduce the profits of the supply chain and the retailer.…”

Section: Related Literature 21 Research On Green Supply Chainmentioning

confidence: 99%

Research on Coordination in a Dual-Channel Green Supply Chain under Live Streaming Mode

Chen¹,

Zhou²,

Liu

et al. 2023

Sustainability

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In this paper, we study the coordination issue in a dual-channel green supply chain with one manufacturer and one retailer. The demand in the traditional channel is assumed to be dependent on retail price, sales effort and green degree. Due to the characteristic of live broadcast selling, the demand in the direct channel is assumed to be dependent on price and discount. On the basis of analyzing price, sales effort and green degree strategies in the supply chain under the centralized model, two decentralized models and two coordination models are presented. Moreover, we prove the feasibility of sharing the R&D costs of the green degree and sales effort costs of the advertisement (CS-GS) contract through bargaining problems achieving a win-win situation, but the revenue sharing and wholesale price (RSC) contract commonly used cannot efficiently coordinate the supply chain. Finally, numerical analysis is given to show the impacts of coordination contracts on the supply chain’s performance as well as the impacts of parameters on profits and decisions in the four models. It reveals that the CS-GS contract can not only help to improve the green degree and the price of the product, but also improve the profitability of all supply chain members.

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Section: Related Literature 21 Research On Green Supply Chainmentioning

confidence: 99%

Research on Coordination in a Dual-Channel Green Supply Chain under Live Streaming Mode

Chen¹,

Zhou²,

Liu

et al. 2023

Sustainability

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

show abstract

“…In recent years, environmental operation and clean production have drawn the widespread attention of many enterprises and even society as a whole. Green supply chain management (GSCM) is a new environmental management mode integrating environmental protection, energy conservation, and other “green” factors into the whole supply chain, which requires enterprises to pursue economic interests as well as environmental concerns (Zong et al, 2022). As one of the top 500 enterprises in the world, Walmart launched the “Project Gigaton” plan under the increasingly serious situation of global warming.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Optimal decisions and coordination mechanism in a green supply chain with loss‐averse consumers in environmental quality

Li,

Zong,

Zhang

2023

Manage Decis Econ

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We consider consumers' loss aversion in environmental quality and develop a two‐period game theoretical model to investigate the optimal pricing and environmental quality decisions for a green supply chain where a manufacturer sells products to consumers through a retailer. We then introduce a two‐part tariff contract to coordinate the supply chain for both periods. We suggest that optimal decisions in the second period depend on the reference point of the first period in the decentralized supply chain. A higher reference point leads to the increased environmental quality of products, prices, and profits of supply chain members in the second period. However, when the reference point is sufficiently high, the environmental quality will be lower to avoid excessive environmental investment costs. Furthermore, consumers' loss aversion reduces the environmental quality of products when the reference point is low. As consumers' loss aversion increases, the manufacturer's profit rises, while the wholesale and retail prices and the retailer's profit show a decreasing and then increasing trend. Finally, we find that a two‐part tariff contract enables the two‐period supply chain to be coordinated and achieve Pareto improvements in profit and environmental quality. This study sheds valuable light on understanding consumer environmental preferences and irrational behavior for supply chain decision‐making and green product design.

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Decision Analysis of Manufacturers’ Misreporting Behavior Considering Retailer Corporate Social Responsibility

Zhao,

Li,

Tan

et al. 2024

Sustainability

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Under the increasingly competitive environment, some manufacturers may misreport costs to boost their own profits, potentially harming the overall interests of the supply chain. Conversely, some retailers may engage in corporate social responsibility (CSR) to promote sustainable development within the supply chain. Thus, this study considers a competitive supply chain comprising one retailer and two manufacturers, and investigates the impact of the manufacturer’s misreporting behavior on the chain supply members’ pricing decisions and performances as well as the impact of retailer CSR on the manufacturer’s misreporting behavior. When the retailer does not engage in CSR, the manufacturers’ misreporting behavior is solely influenced by misreporting factors. If the misreporting factors of both manufacturers are low, they can always benefit from their misreporting behavior. Interestingly, if one manufacturer has a high misreporting factor while the other has a low one, the manufacturer whose misreport factor is high does not misreport its cost, instead benefiting from the competitor’s misreporting behavior. When the retailer engages in CSR, the manufacturer’s misreporting behavior is influenced not only by their misreporting factors but also by the degree of product substitutability. If product substitutability is low, both manufacturers do not have an incentive to misreport their costs. If product substitutability is moderate and both misreporting factors are low, they can benefit from their misreporting behavior. However, when product substitutability is high, if one manufacturer misreports, the other will refrain from doing so.

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Decision Making in Green Supply Chain with Manufacturers’ Misreporting Behavior

Cited by 3 publications

References 62 publications

Research on Coordination in a Dual-Channel Green Supply Chain under Live Streaming Mode

Research on Coordination in a Dual-Channel Green Supply Chain under Live Streaming Mode

Optimal decisions and coordination mechanism in a green supply chain with loss‐averse consumers in environmental quality

Decision Analysis of Manufacturers’ Misreporting Behavior Considering Retailer Corporate Social Responsibility

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