Delegation and Accountability

Fox, Justin; Stuart, Jordan

doi:10.2139/ssrn.1524585

Cited by 11 publications

(15 citation statements)

References 25 publications

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“…See, for example, Almendares and Le Bihan (), Ashworth (, ), Ashworth and Bueno de Mesquita (, ), Banks and Sundaram (), Besley (), Besley and Burgess (), Besley and Prat (), Canes‐Wrone, Herron, and Shotts (), Coate (), Daley and Snowberg (), Eggers (), Fox and Jordan (), Fox and Stephenson (, ), Fox and Van Weelden (, ), Gehlbach (), Gordon, Huber, and Landa (), Lohmann (), Maskin and Tirole (), Myerson (), and Persson and Tabellini ().…”

mentioning

confidence: 99%

Learning about Voter Rationality

Ashworth

Mesquita

Friedenberg

2017

American J Political Sci

161

103

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An important empirical literature evaluates whether voters are rational by examining how electoral outcomes respond to events outside the control of politicians, such as natural disasters or economic shocks. The argument is that rational voters should not base electoral decisions on such events, so evidence that these events affect electoral outcomes is evidence of voter irrationality. We show that such events can affect electoral outcomes, even if voters are rational and have instrumental preferences. The reason is that these events change voters' opportunities to learn new information about incumbents. Thus, identifying voter (ir)rationality requires more than just identifying the impact of exogenous shocks on electoral fortunes. Our analysis highlights systematic ways in which electoral fortunes are expected to change in response to events outside incumbents' control. Such results can inform empirical work attempting to identify voter (ir)rationality. theoretical literature assumes voter rationality and claims to provide insight into a variety of political phenomena. 1 If actual voter behavior dramatically diverges from the assumptions in those models, then there is reason to be skeptical about that research agenda. An important empirical literature attempts to assess whether voters are indeed rational, examining the response of electoral outcomes to exogenous shocks outside the control of politicians. 2 The idea is that, with rational voters, these shocks should not affect incumbents' electoral fortunes. Although several studies find that incumbent electoral fortunes are unaffected by exogenous

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confidence: 99%

Learning about Voter Rationality

Ashworth

Mesquita

Friedenberg

2017

American J Political Sci

161

103

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“…Compute voter welfare as (Pr(e 1 = S 1 ) + Pr(e 2 = S 2 )) using (11), (12), and (13), and di¤erentiate with respect to to obtain the result.…”

Section: Resultsmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…In political science, studies on delegation usually take a positive (as opposed to normative) approach and ask about the conditions under which a politician will choose to delegate some of his authority to another, possibly non-elected, decision maker (e.g., Horn, 1995, Epstein and O'Halloran, 1999, Gailmard and Patty, 2007, Fox and Jordan, 2011. Applied to civil service rules, this literature suggests interesting reasons why a politician might want to introduce laws that grant bureaucrats substantial discretion.…”

Section: Related Literaturementioning

confidence: 99%

“…over bureaucrats. 13 The probability of a good bureaucrat is , and I start by assuming that the bureaucrat's type is realized independently in each period. This may capture a situation where the speci…c bureaucrat charged with policy implementation is drawn randomly from the bureaucracy, so that the politician only interacts with any one bureaucrat over a short horizon.…”

Section: Setupmentioning

confidence: 99%

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Civil Service Reform

Ujhelyi

2012

SSRN Journal

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“…It has subsequently developed into the modifi ed orthodox public administration school, which tries to provide more space for career offi cials to design policies in areas where political offi cials lack the capacity to do so. Fox and Jordan (2011) state that the task delegation by political actors to the bureaucracy is indeed carried out, theoretically, by politicians as it allows them to shy away from full responsibility of policies that lessen voters' interest. Politicians would not delegate if the policy is aligned with the voters' interest.…”

Section: Relational Patterns Of Bureaucratic and P O L I T I C A L O mentioning

confidence: 99%

Compliance and Conflict of Value in Public Policy Implementation: Comparison between the New Order and the Reformation Era

Indiahono

Purwanto

Pramusinto

2018

pgr

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This research aims to examine diﬀerences in the relationship of bureaucratic and political oﬃcials during the New Order (Soeharto’s era) and the Reformation (post-Soeharto) era within the arena of public policy implementation. This is a matter of importance given that there is a change in relations between the two from integration in the New Order to bureaucratic impartiality in the Reformation Era. This study attempts to answer the question: How were the relations of bureaucratic and political oﬃcials in the implementation of local level public policy during the New Order and the Reformation Era? A qualitative research has been conducted in Tegal Municipality using the following data collection techniques: interview, focus group discussion, documentation, and observation. Tegal Municipality was selected as the study location because of the unique relationship shown between the mayor and the bureaucracy. Its uniqueness lies in the emergence of bureaucratic oﬃcials who dare to oppose political oﬃcials, based on their convictions that bureaucratic/public values should be maintained even if it means having to be in direct conflict with political oﬃcials. This research indicates that the relationship between bureaucratic and political oﬃcials in the arena of local level policy implementation during the New Order was characterized as being full of pressure and compliance, whereas during the Reformation Era bureaucrats have the audacity to hinder policy implementation. Such audacity to thwart policies is considered to have developed from a stance that aims to protect public budget and values in policies. The occurring conflict of values here demonstrates a dichotomy of political and bureaucratic oﬃcials that is diﬀerent from the prevailing definition of politics-administration dichotomy introduced at the onset of Public Administration studies.

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Delegation and Accountability

Cited by 11 publications

References 25 publications

Learning about Voter Rationality

Learning about Voter Rationality

Civil Service Reform

Compliance and Conflict of Value in Public Policy Implementation: Comparison between the New Order and the Reformation Era

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