Deliberative Democracy and the Discursive Dilemma

Faut-il défendre la société ? Foucault, la guerre et les métaphores selon lesquelles nous vivons

“…Čini se da rat uključuje i rat unutar čovjeka, podrazumijevajući podijeljena sebstva koja dolaze do izražaja jednako u platonističkim prispodobama o zvijerima i kočijama, cijelom diskursu psihoanalize i primjerima teoretičara deliberacije koji aporije odlučivanja predstavljaju kroz podijeljena sebstva. Poput Pettita, kod kojega podijeljena sebstva nađu u nevolji odlučujući treba li kupiti volvo -ekonomsko, ekološko i socijalno sebstvo teško se dogovore oko takvih pitanja (Pettit, 2001) -Foucault metaforički govori o ratu u nama, o društvenoj i psihološkoj agoniji koja se ne zaustavlja na ontološkom pragu pojedinca nego ga prelazi pretpostavljajući rat jedinstvu sebstva. Može se zaključiti da je ratna hipoteza doista ontološki dalekosežna.…”

Judgment Aggregation

“…True True True 1/3 of individuals True False False 1/3 of individuals False True False Majority True True False Table 2. The fact that majority voting may generate inconsistent collective judgments is sometimes called the 'discursive dilemma' [Pettit, 2001;List and Pettit, 2002; see also Brennan, 2001], but it is perhaps best described as the problem of 'majority inconsistency'. The fact that majority voting may generate inconsistent collective judgments is sometimes called the 'discursive dilemma' [Pettit, 2001;List and Pettit, 2002; see also Brennan, 2001], but it is perhaps best described as the problem of 'majority inconsistency'.…”

“…As argued by Pettit [2001], collective consistency is essential for the contestability and justifiability of collective decisions (for critical discussions of this point, see also [Kornhauser and Sager, 2004;). Again the condition seems prima facie reasonable.…”

“…This rule was discussed, originally under the name 'issue-byissue voting', by Kornhauser and Sager [1986] and Kornhauser [1992], and later by Pettit [2001], List and Pettit [2002], Chapman [2002], Bovens and Rabinowicz [2006], Dietrich [2006] and many others. The simplest example of such a rule is the premise-based procedure, which I have already briefly mentioned in the context of Kornhauser and Sager's doctrinal paradox.…”

“…1 The initial observation that sparked the recent development of the field goes back to some work in jurisprudence, on decision-making in collegial courts [Kornhauser and Sager, 1986;1993;Kornhauser, 1992], but was later reinterpreted more generally -as a problem of majority inconsistency -by Pettit [2001], Brennan [2001] and List and Pettit [2002]. Although this article is not intended to be a comprehensive survey, a few historical remarks are useful.…”