Design of live broadcast service outsourcing contract considering risk aversion and financial constraints

Lack of incentive strategies within the health crowdsourcing platform has resulted in the loss of patient innovation and the failure in the diffusion of patients' innovations. To solve this problem, we compared four incentive strategies: (i) without incentive, (ii) cost‐sharing incentive, (iii) revenue‐sharing incentive, and (iv) a hybrid incentive strategy combining cost‐sharing and revenue‐sharing. Our analysis indicates that the innovation guidance effect is at its lowest level without incentive strategies, and the hybrid incentive strategy can maximize both innovation enthusiasm and profits. Furthermore, there exists a threshold for revenue‐sharing ratio, making the incentive effect of revenue‐sharing strategy better than that of the cost‐sharing strategy. Finally, short‐sighted thinking among platform participants will reduce the innovation enthusiasm of altruistic patients and the incentive investment of the platform. This study provides guiding principles for the health crowdsourcing platform to regulate online patient innovation solutions.

Section: Research On the Innovation Incentivementioning

confidence: 99%

Optimal innovation incentive strategies within the health crowdsourcing platform

Liu,

Ma,

Zhu

2024

“…This paper enriches the existing literature from the four main aspects. First, different from the contract design‐related literature which focuses on the supply chain and assumes that the type of agents is discrete (Bhargava et al, 2022; Xiao & Shi, 2016; Zhou et al, 2023), this paper studies when the live streaming platform should offer the contract and gives the optimal contract to agents if the agents' types are continuous. Second, unlike the asymmetric information literature (Xiao & Shi, 2016), this paper focuses on not only the private service abilities of live streamers before contracting but also their noncontractible service efforts after contracting under dual asymmetric information.…”

Section: Related Literaturementioning

confidence: 99%

“…One paper is most closely related to our work. Under the assumption that the live broadcast capability of the live broadcast company is discrete, Zhou et al (2023) investigate the optimal live broadcast service outsourcing contract between a live broadcast company and an enterprise, without considering the live streaming platform. Accordingly, compared with prior literature, we study the optimal contract design between the platform and the continuous types of agents and further examine the conditions under which the platform offers contracts.…”

Section: Contract Designmentioning

confidence: 99%

Optimal contract design for live streaming platforms under dual asymmetric information considering corporate social responsibility

Zhang

Wang

2023

When live streamers sell products to consumers on live streaming platforms, their abilities and service efforts are private, and thus, the issues of identifying their true abilities, motivating them to use appropriate service efforts, and providing a mechanism to allocate profits remain to be resolved for live streaming platforms. Adopting a principal–agent model, we investigate the optimal contract design between a live streaming platform and live streamers. In addition, we study the impacts of the price and service competition between live streamers and the platform's corporate social responsibility on the optimal contract design. The results show that high commission rates and low signing bonuses are not always beneficial to platforms, and the optimal contract design to identify the types of live streamers can make it more profitable. In addition, the utility‐maximizing platform always sets lower commission rates and signing bonuses compared with the profit‐maximizing platform. Regardless of the platform's goal, total profits and commission rates are higher under competition compared with no competition. For the government, policies and subsidies should be provided, such as regulating commission rates by setting a limited range and increasing subsidies for the marginal costs of live streaming platforms, which can effectively motivate live streaming platforms to enhance corporate social responsibility.

Information disclosure strategies of live‐streaming supply chains in the digi‐economy era

Ma,

Liu

2024

Live e‐commerce is one of the important forms of digital transformation of supply chain, which has become increasingly popular in recent years as a powerful tool for internet advertising, interaction, and merchandising. We propose two pricing models to examine the strategies of information disclosure and pricing within the live‐streaming supply chain. One model revolves around the agency framework, wherein the manufacturer determines the price while the streamer decides the level of information disclosure. The other model pertains to a self‐implementing framework, wherein the manufacturer determines both the level of information disclosure and the price. To evaluate the robustness of our findings, we extend our models to encompass three significant scenarios: (i) the platform involvement model, where a live‐streaming support platform becomes part of the supply chain; (ii) the fixed price model, which externalizes the manufacturer's pricing decision; and (iii) the dual‐channel operations model. Our analysis reveals that the cost associated with information disclosure impacts the streamer's profits in a nonlinear manner within the agency model. Interestingly, expanding the revenue‐sharing parameter does not invariably favor the manufacturer. Moreover, we observe that none of the live‐streaming sales models exhibits a clear advantage over the others. Additionally, we demonstrate that the platform's involvement limits the manufacturer's ability to utilize the agency model for live‐streaming sales. In situations with fixed pricing, the manufacturer is advised to disclose more production information during live‐streaming sales.