Die „Alternative für Deutschland“: eine Partei für Modernisierungsverlierer?

Lengfeld, Holger

doi:10.1007/s11577-017-0446-1

Cited by 112 publications

(40 citation statements)

References 19 publications

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“…While the discussions about the drivers of AfD support are ongoing and mirror the discussion over the economic and cultural roots of populist support more generally, themes of anxiety and anger are persistent across these different explanations (Niedermayer and Hofrichter, 2016;Lengfeld, 2017). As such, Germany and the growth of AfD support provide an important test case for the relationship between anger, anxiety, and voters' support for right-wing populism.…”

Section: Resultsmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…Populist parties have successfully established themselves in most Western and Central European countries (Rydgren, 2005(Rydgren, , 2007Taggart, 2017), which has led not only to an ongoing debate about the precise nature of populism, but also raised the question how this seemingly sudden emergence can be explained. However, particularly on the demand side, most of the existing work has focused on structural or attitudinal factors (Kehrberg, 2015;Niedermayer and Hofrichter, 2016;Lengfeld, 2017;Van Hauwaert and Van Kessel, 2018), whose relative stability make it difficult to explain their sudden political "activation" (Bonikowski, 2017;Hawkins, Kaltwasser and Andreadis, 2018;Van Hauwaert and Van Kessel, 2018).…”

Section: Determinants Of Right-wing Populismmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…Especially with regards to supporters for right-wing populist parties, this "losers of globalization" thesis implicitly argues voters channel their anxiety and anger over their disadvantaged position into a rejection of cosmopolitan elites and immigration alike. While debates are ongoing whether this backlash is primarily driven by economic insecurity, or simply a cultural backlash against the perceived loss of privilege, the empirical support for the link between socioeconomic disadvantage and populism remains mixed at best (Knigge, 1998;Ivarsflaten, 2005;Lengfeld, 2017;Rooduijn, 2017;Stockemer, Lentz and Mayer, 2018).…”

Section: Determinants Of Right-wing Populismmentioning

confidence: 99%

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Emotions and Populist Support

Nguyen¹

2019

Preprint

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Is there a special relationship between emotions and populism? Academic and popular discussions of populism frequently suggest that this is the case, and that anger and anxiety in particular, are crucial explanatory factors for the continued appeal of populist parties. But despite the often-posited link between negative emotions and populism, few studies have explored this relationship empirically. This paper aims to fill this gap and answer three related questions: Firstly, to what extent is the relationship between negative affect and populist party support unique to these parties and do we observe differences between left and right-wing populism? Secondly, what is the temporal relationship between affect and populism? Do voters support populist parties because they are anxious or does support for these parties create these negative emotions? And finally, are populists angry, scared, or both? In other words, to what extent do we need to distinguish between specific types of negative affect, such as anger and anxiety, when discussing the emotional underpinnings of populism? Comparing panel data from Austria and Germany, this paper investigates the relationship between anger and anxiety on the one hand, and support for populist parties on the other. Using a random-intercept, autoregressive cross-lagged design, the paper has three findings. First of all, the reinforcing pattern of increased negative emotions and increased party support is unique to (right-wing) populists. Secondly, this relationship is self-reinforcing. While negative affect leads to greater support for right wing populist parties, the reverse relationship is more consistent and of larger magnitude. Negative emotions trigger populist support, but they are more important for maintaining it. Finally, it is important to distinguish between anger and anxiety. While only anxiety is consistent in its ability to trigger populist support, subsequently both anger and anxiety are increased.

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Section: Resultsmentioning

confidence: 99%

Section: Determinants Of Right-wing Populismmentioning

confidence: 99%

Section: Determinants Of Right-wing Populismmentioning

confidence: 99%

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Emotions and Populist Support

Nguyen¹

2019

Preprint

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“…Es handele sich um einen Bruch in der politischen Kultur, ja um den "Saatboden für einen neuen Faschismus" (Habermas 2016, S. 39), entgegnen andere. Wo manche einen kulturellen Konflikt ausmachen, der von den Mittelschichten ausgeht oder innerhalb der sozialen Mitte ausgetra-gen wird (Koppetsch 2017, S. 212;Lengfeld 2017), sprechen Kontrahentinnen 2 im Anschluss an Didier Eribon (2016) oder Arlie Hochschild (2017a) von "neuen Arbeiterparteien" (Gertz 2017; differenzierter: Jörke und Nachtwey 2017; S. 174), die den Habenichtsen einen wirksamen Protest gegen das Establishment und dessen "progressiven Neoliberalismus" (Fraser 2017) ermöglichten. Zwischen den Polen bewegt sich, wer neue Spaltungslinien "weniger in den ökonomischen als in der kulturell-identitären Sphäre" verortet (Merkel 2017, S. 56), Spannungen zwischen "kulturellen Klassen" aber klar benennt (Reckwitz 2017, S. 273 ff.…”

Section: Mots-clésunclassified

“…Von Gerechtigkeitsproblemen getrieben, wird aus Sicht vieler sozialwissenschaftlicher Interpretinnen nur, wer arm, lange erwerbslos oder prekär beschäftigt ist. Alle, auf die dergleichen nicht zutrifft, werden der sozialen Mitte zugerechnet und haben, so der analytische Kurzschluss, andere als Gerechtigkeitsprobleme (IW 2017;Lengfeld 2017). Auf diese Weise verstellt der "Mythos Mitte" (Kadritzke 2017) den Blick dafür, dass es sich auch bei gut verdienenden Fachkräf-ten um Lohnabhängige handelt.…”

Section: Von Der Prekarität Zur Bewährungsprobe Des Lohnsunclassified

Arbeiterbewegung von rechts? Motive und Grenzen einer imaginären Revolte

et al. 2018

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A Labor Movement from the Right? Motives and limits of an imaginary revoltAbstract The article examines populist and völkisch orientations of unionized workers, some of them active members of workers' councils. It empirically shows how, in respondents' everyday consciousness, protest motifs are intermingled with an ethnicized view of the social question. Völkisch populism can be interpreted as a Polanyi-type movement that is motivated by problems generated by post-growth capitalism, presenting itself as a venture to give back power to the people. Its revolt remains an imaginary one, though, for, ultimately in accordance with existing power relations, it aims at reconstructing an irretrievable past. Our empirical results keep a distance from monocausal explanations, though call to mind issues of class that have long been neglected. As workers perceive the current distribution of wealth as unjust, yet don't believe in any possibility for change, they are spontaneously inclined to redefine existing top-down conflicts into inclusion-exclusion types. Professional right-wing populists take up and aggravate this tendency of exclusive solidarity and thereby pose a serious challenge for the unions as well as for democratic civil societies.Keywords Workers · Unions · Ethnopluralism · Exclusive solidarity · Class society · Class politics · Post-growth capitalism · Distributional conflicts · Racism · Right-wing populism · Right-wing extremism Un mouvement ouvrier de droite ? Motifs et limites d'une révolte imaginaireRésumé Cet article se penche sur les orientations populistes à caractère ethnonationaliste (völkisch) d'ouvriers engagés au sein de l'entreprise, organisés dans des syndicats et, pour certains, membres du comité d'entreprise. À l'aide d'une étude empirique approfondie, il est montré comment dans la conscience quotidienne des personnes interrogées les motifs de protestation se conjuguent à une ethnicisation de la question sociale. Le populisme ethno-nationaliste peut être interprété comme un mouvement au sens de Polanyi qui est alimenté par les problèmes générés par le capitalisme post-croissance contemporain et se présente comme un projet de démo-cratisation. Cependant, cette révolte populiste reste imaginaire en ceci qu'elle vise le rétablissement de conditions qui ne sauraient être rétablies, faisant ainsi finalement le jeu de la domination. Les résultats de cette étude empirique ne se prêtent pas aisément à des explications monocausales mais renvoient à une problématique de classe refoulée. Comme il paraît vain de corriger fondamentalement un régime de K Arbeiterbewegung von rechts? Motive und Grenzen einer imaginären Revolte 57 répartition ressenti comme injuste, les salariés tendent spontanément à redéfinir les conflits entre le haut et le bas en conflits entre l'intérieur et l'extérieur. Les organisations de la droite populiste s'emparent de cette tendance à la solidarité exclusive et la renforcent, posant ainsi un défi aux sociétés civiles démocratiques et aux syndicats.

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Emotional Mobilization: The Affective Underpinnings of Right-Wing Populist Party Support

Betz

Oswald

2021

The Palgrave Handbook of Populism

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Die „Alternative für Deutschland“: eine Partei für Modernisierungsverlierer?

Cited by 112 publications

References 19 publications

Emotions and Populist Support

Emotions and Populist Support

Arbeiterbewegung von rechts? Motive und Grenzen einer imaginären Revolte

Emotional Mobilization: The Affective Underpinnings of Right-Wing Populist Party Support

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