Dissociating brain systems that respond to contingency and valence during monetary loss avoidance in adolescence

Dessel, Jeroen Van; Danckaerts, Marina; Moerkerke, Matthijs; Oord, Saskia Van der; Morsink, Sarah; Lemiere, Jurgen; Sonuga‐Barke, Edmund

doi:10.1016/j.bandc.2021.105723

Cited by 3 publications

(6 citation statements)

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“…Participants performed the EMLI task (Van Dessel et al, 2021), while their brain responses were acquired under fMRI (Figure 1). At the start of each trial, one of three possible geometrical cues (2 s) predicted a contingent or non-contingent monetary outcome.…”

Section: Experimental Paradigm and Trainingmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…Finally, we explored the effect of age on these effects. Based on previous fMRI studies on age-related reward processing differences in ADHD (Von Rhein et al, 2015) and monetary loss avoidance effects in typically developing adolescents (Van Dessel et al, 2021), no age-related findings were anticipated.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 98%

“…We were recently able to distinguish brain networks activated by contingency-related and valence-related (positive and negative) cues in typically developing adolescents using a modified version of the MID task, the Escape Monetary Loss Incentive (EMLI) task, which contrasts cues predicting either certain monetary loss or certain loss avoidance (no contingency) with a cue predicting conditional loss where monetary loss was determined by performance (Van Dessel et al, 2021). Contingency processing, revealed by contrasting the conditional loss condition with the certain loss and certain avoidance conditions, was associated with the activation of the salience [i.e.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…First, cues indicating that monetary loss could be avoided by fast responding (CONDITIONAL LOSS AVOIDANCE) will be (i) more motivational salient, (ii) increase mobilization of cognitive resources that prepare for responding and (iii) lead to faster reaction times than both conditions where there was no contingency between performance and outcome (CERTAIN LOSS or CERTAIN LOSS AVOIDANCE) irrespective of the valence of the cues (i.e. the negative reinforcement effect) (Van Dessel et al, 2021). We expected these effects in the salience and motor preparation network to be smaller individuals with ADHD compared to typically developing controls based on their reward processing deficits (Luman et al, 2005).…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

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The limits of motivational influence in ADHD: no evidence for an altered reaction to negative reinforcement

Dessel

Sonuga‐Barke

Moerkerke

et al. 2021

Social Cognitive and Affective Neuroscience

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Functional Magnetic Resonance Imaging (fMRI) studies have reported a diminished response in the brain’s reward circuits to contingent cues predicting future monetary gain in adolescents with attention-deficit/hyperactivity disorder (ADHD). The situation with regard to monetary loss is less clear, despite recognition that both positive and negative consequences impact ADHD behaviour. Here, we employ a new Escape Monetary Loss Incentive task in the MRI scanner, which allows the differentiation of contingency and valence effects during loss avoidance, to examine ADHD-related alterations in monetary loss processing. There was no evidence of atypical processing of contingent or non-contingent monetary loss cues in ADHD - either in terms of ratings of emotional and motivational significance or brain responses. This suggests that the ability to process contingencies between performance and negative outcomes is intact in ADHD and that individuals with ADHD are no more (or less) sensitive to negative outcomes than controls. This latter finding stands in stark contrast to recent evidence from a similar task of atypical emotion network recruitment (e.g., amygdala) in ADHD individuals to cues predicting another negative event the imposition of delay suggesting marked specificity in the way they respond to negative events.

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Section: Experimental Paradigm and Trainingmentioning

confidence: 99%

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 98%

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

See 2 more Smart Citations

The limits of motivational influence in ADHD: no evidence for an altered reaction to negative reinforcement

Dessel

Sonuga‐Barke

Moerkerke

et al. 2021

Social Cognitive and Affective Neuroscience

Self Cite

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“…, and where participants' responses were faster in a loss prevention than in a loss task(van Dessel et al, 2021). Considering that the response latencies in the loss prevention task resembled response latencies in the loss task in Study 1, Experiment 1 (see Study 1, Experiment 1 Time Course Analysis Response Latencies results…”

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confidence: 92%

Negative Reinforcement in the Description-Experience Gap

Smieszhala¹

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When faced with decisions in everyday life, sometimes an individual knows the probability of an event occurring and bases their decision on that knowledge (decision from description). In other situations, the individual does not know that probability and bases their decision on information learned through experience (decision from experience). In decisions from description, people are more risk averse in decisions involving gains (positive reinforcement) and more risk seeking in decisions involving losses (negative punishment). The reverse is evident in decisions from experience – the description-experience gap. Across eight experiments I investigated decisions about loss prevention (negative reinforcement). These types of decisions are analogous to many everyday decisions, particularly within medical contexts but have not been examined previously. Participants completed a computer task where they could prevent the loss of points (negative reinforcement condition), as well as gain (positive reinforcement condition) and lose (negative punishment condition) points by clicking on images of doors. On each trial, participants chose between a safe (guaranteed chance of a smaller outcome) and a risky (non-guaranteed chance of a larger outcome) alternative. Across experiments, I varied the outcome probability of the risky alternative’s larger outcome. In Study 1 I investigated whether I would observe a description-experience gap in decisions involving loss prevention. I also examined whether I would replicate a description-experience gap in decisions about gains and decisions about losses. Participants completed description, experience, and hybrid (i.e. a combination of descriptive information and experience) conditions. The outcome probability of the risky choice alternative’s larger outcome was either 50% or 20% across experiments. In decisions about loss prevention, information obtained from description produced lower risk preference than information obtained from a) experience when the outcome probability of the larger outcome was 50%, and b) hybrid information when the outcome probability of the larger outcome was 20%. Regarding decisions about gains and decisions about losses, the data of the current thesis lend only partial support to the phenomenon of a description-experience gap. Because in many everyday situations an individual has both descriptive information and experience available to them, in Study 2 I investigated decisions from hybrid information more closely. I investigated whether the hybrid’s description or its experience component drives risk preference in situations where those two components conflict. Participants completed experience, hybrid/conflict, and hybrid/congruent conditions. The outcome probability of the risky choice alternative’s larger outcome was either 50%, 20%, or 10% across experiments. Results suggested that conflicting descriptions affected participants’ choice behaviour where the likelihood of the risky alternative’s larger outcome occurring was 10% and 50%, but not when it was 20%. Across experiments, choice behaviour in decisions about loss prevention and in decisions from hybrid information did not consistently follow the predictions of previous literature regarding decisions about gains/losses, and decisions from description/experience, respectively. Decisions about loss prevention and decisions from hybrid information should be added to existing frameworks of decisions making to enable researchers to arrive at predictions of choice behaviour in those decisions. I proposed first steps towards a framework of decisions from hybrid information.

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