Do Agents “Run Amok”? A Comparison of Agency Slack in the EU and US Trade Policy in the Doha Round

Abstract

There has been considerable debate about the delegation of power to international organizations, but few studies compare national public administrations with international organizations. In the meantime, international and national bureaucrats are important actors in world politics since they represent states in the international arena. Sometimes executive agents attempt to bypass control by member states and to overreach their delegated authority (agency slack), while at other times they do not. How and under what conditions do agents engage in slack? To answer this question, the article builds on principal-agent theories by comparing different forms of power delegation at the national and international levels. It argues that the institutional design of delegation contract and oversight mechanisms have an impact on the extent of agency slack. In developing this argument, it compares the delegation of power from the legislature (the US Congress) to a national public administration (the United States Trade Representative) and from an intergovernmental organization (the Council of Ministers) to a supranational organization (the European Commission) in the negotiation of international trade agreements. The findings show that agency slack is less likely when the institutional design of the delegation mandate is rule-based and principals have a combination of police-patrol and firealarm oversight mechanisms at their disposal to control their agents.

Divide and conquer? China and the cacophony of foreign investment rules in the EU

“…When principals have heterogeneous preferences but negotiate as one whole, they can derive strength from this supposed weakness because having their hands tied internally can lead them to obtain greater concessions externally (Schelling 1960). This particular paradox has been well documented in the case of EU trade policy (Conceição-Heldt 2013;Damro 2007;Duer and Elsig 2011;Meunier 2005).…”

How Financial Resources Affect the Autonomy of International Public Administrations

“…On the one hand, principal‐agent scholars in the tradition of political economy define autonomy as ‘the range of potential independent action available to an agent after the principal has established mechanisms of control’ (Hawkins et al., , p. 8). Despite the openness of the principal‐agent model to different assumptions about actors’ preferences, autonomy is predominantly considered conducive to agency problems such as shirking, slack, or slippage (Cortell and Peterson, ; da Conceição‐Heldt, ; Vaubel, ). On the other hand, scholars studying IOs from a sociological perspective share a more optimistic understanding of autonomy.…”

National Administrations in EU Trade Policy

“…Obviously, the aforementioned formal procedures still matter, but also, in the discussions leading up to the provision of a mandate or during debates on the ratifi cation of an agreement, representatives exert control through the provision of signals. Such signalling can also serve an external purpose, showing the negotiating partner that the Commission is facing severe internal constraints (Da Conceição-Heldt, 2013 ).…”