Do Parties Matter for Economic Outcomes? A Regression-Discontinuity Approach

Pettersson‐Lidbom, Per

doi:10.1162/jeea.2008.6.5.1037

Cited by 287 publications

(159 citation statements)

References 25 publications

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“…If the RDD is indeed quasi-random and the identifying assumptions are fulfilled, controls are not necessary for identification and should not change much in terms of results. However, it has been argued that including them can increase the precision of the estimates and may be especially worthwhile in the case of a low number of observations (Hoxby (2000), Pettersson-Lidbom (2008), and Pettersson-Lidbom (2012)). where no effect is expected).…”

Section: D4 Resultsmentioning

confidence: 99%

Divided we reform? Evidence from US welfare policies

Bernecker

2016

Journal of Public Economics

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Standard-Nutzungsbedingungen:Die Dokumente auf EconStor dürfen zu eigenen wissenschaftlichen Zwecken und zum Privatgebrauch gespeichert und kopiert werden.Sie dürfen die Dokumente nicht für öffentliche oder kommerzielle Zwecke vervielfältigen, öffentlich ausstellen, öffentlich zugänglich machen, vertreiben oder anderweitig nutzen.Sofern die Verfasser die Dokumente unter Open-Content-Lizenzen (insbesondere CC-Lizenzen) zur Verfügung gestellt haben sollten, gelten abweichend von diesen Nutzungsbedingungen die in der dort genannten Lizenz gewährten Nutzungsrechte. Divided We Reform? Evidence from US Welfare Policies Abstract Divided government is often thought of as causing legislative deadlock. I investigate the link between divided government and economic reforms using a novel data set on welfare reforms in US states between 1978 and 2010. Panel data regressions show that under divided government a US state is around 25% more likely to adopt a welfare reform than under unified government. An analysis of close elections providing quasi-random variation in the form of government and other robustness checks confirm this counter-intuitive finding. The empirical evidence is consistent with an explanation based on policy competition between governor, senate, and house. JEL-Code: D720, D780, H110, H750. Terms of use: Documents in EconStor may

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Section: D4 Resultsmentioning

confidence: 99%

Divided we reform? Evidence from US welfare policies

Bernecker

2016

Journal of Public Economics

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“…That the autonomy from central government is not just formal has been shown in several empirical studies (e.g. Pettersson-Lidbom, 2008 andSvaleryd andVlachos, 2007).…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 89%

Women's representation and public spending

Svaleryd

2009

European Journal of Political Economy

146

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“…This empirical strategy was first developed by Thistlethwaite and Campbell (1960) in educational science and has since been frequently used in economics and especially political economic research (see Lee, 2008;Pettersson-Lidbom, 2008;Ade and Freier, 2011a). For the exposition here, we closely follow Freier (2011).…”

Section: Empirical Model and Methodologymentioning

confidence: 99%

Voters prefer more qualified mayors, but does it matter for public finances? Evidence for Germany

Freier

Thomasius

2015

Int Tax Public Finance

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Standard-Nutzungsbedingungen:Die Dokumente auf EconStor dürfen zu eigenen wissenschaftlichen Zwecken und zum Privatgebrauch gespeichert und kopiert werden.Sie dürfen die Dokumente nicht für öffentliche oder kommerzielle Zwecke vervielfältigen, öffentlich ausstellen, öffentlich zugänglich machen, vertreiben oder anderweitig nutzen.Sofern die Verfasser die Dokumente unter Open-Content-Lizenzen (insbesondere CC-Lizenzen) zur Verfügung gestellt haben sollten, gelten abweichend von diesen Nutzungsbedingungen die in der dort genannten Lizenz gewährten Nutzungsrechte. This paper studies the importance of politician's qualification, in terms of education and experience, for fiscal outcomes. The analysis is based on a large panel for 2,031 German municipalities for which we have collected information on municipal budgets as well as the election results and qualification levels of mayoral candidates. We principally use a Regression Discontinuity Design focusing on close elections to estimate causal effects. We find that mayors with prior experience in office indeed tend to reduce the level of local public debt, lower total municipal expenditures and decrease the local taxes. In contrast, the education level of the mayor exerts no significant effects on the overall fiscal performance of the municipality. The results are partly surprising as both education and experience are shown to matter greatly in the electoral success of mayoral candidates. Terms of use: Documents in

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Do Parties Matter for Economic Outcomes? A Regression-Discontinuity Approach

Cited by 287 publications

References 25 publications

Divided we reform? Evidence from US welfare policies

Divided we reform? Evidence from US welfare policies

Women's representation and public spending

Voters prefer more qualified mayors, but does it matter for public finances? Evidence for Germany

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