Do Unbundling Policies Discourage CLEC Facilities-Based Investment

Crandall, Robert W.; Ingraham, Allan T.; Singer, Hal J.

doi:10.2202/1538-0653.1136

Cited by 56 publications

(33 citation statements)

References 2 publications

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“…They find that the number of unbundled DSL connections per capita is negatively correlated with the number of fibre connections. Similarly, Briglauer et al (2011) 20 16 See for example Crandall et al (2004) or Hausman, J. and G. Sidak (2005): "Did mandatory unbundling achieve its purpose? Empirical evidence from five countries" Journal of Competition Law and Economics, 1(1), 173-245.…”

Section: The Empirical Evidence Of the Loi Theorymentioning

confidence: 99%

Evidence for a Ladder of Investment in Central and Eastern European countries

Serdarević

Hunt²,

Ovington

et al. 2016

Telecommunications Policy

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Standard-Nutzungsbedingungen:Die Dokumente auf EconStor dürfen zu eigenen wissenschaftlichen Zwecken und zum Privatgebrauch gespeichert und kopiert werden.Sie dürfen die Dokumente nicht für öffentliche oder kommerzielle Zwecke vervielfältigen, öffentlich ausstellen, öffentlich zugänglich machen, vertreiben oder anderweitig nutzen.Sofern die Verfasser die Dokumente unter Open-Content-Lizenzen (insbesondere CC-Lizenzen) zur Verfügung gestellt haben sollten, gelten abweichend von diesen Nutzungsbedingungen die in der dort genannten Lizenz gewährten Nutzungsrechte. Abstract: The model of liberalisation of European telecommunications markets had followed what has become known as the "ladder of investment" (LoI) hypothesis: under this hypothesis entrants are expected to make progressively greater investments in their own networks, whilst decreasing their dependence on the network of the incumbent fixed operator. The ultimate goal of the LoI approach is to achieve, where feasible, inter-platform competition. Terms of use: Documents inFrom a theoretical perspective, there are opposing forces at work: whilst offering retail services based on access to the incumbent's network at the 'first rung' of the ladder is less risky, access seekers may find that investing to step-up on the 'second and higher rungs' of the ladder too risky. It is therefore unclear from a theoretical perspective whether the LoI approach will lead to inter-platform competition.Whether and under what circumstances it would is thus an empirical question.Our paper focuses on the evidence for the LoI in Central and Eastern European (CEE) countries. Our analysis shows that the evidence available for CEE is consistent with entrants in CEE countries largely by-passing the LoI, by directly investing in their own networks. There are good reasons for this, as some of the assumptions underlying the LoI theory, such as good quality and universally available copper networks and relatively high cost and risk of investing in alternative infrastructure, do not necessarily hold in CEE countries. Our paper's results are broadly consistent with most of the existing literature and represents a valuable contribution by providing an insight into the applicability of the LoI to CEE countries.

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Section: The Empirical Evidence Of the Loi Theorymentioning

confidence: 99%

Evidence for a Ladder of Investment in Central and Eastern European countries

Serdarević

Hunt²,

Ovington

et al. 2016

Telecommunications Policy

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“…6 station mt is the number of the stations which NTT adopted the …ber-optic lines. We use this variable as the measurement of quantity of NTT's line.…”

Section: Linear Regression Modelsmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…When …rms with no 6 We divided by number of households, because oftenly when number of households increase, number of user …rms increase. However, there are possibility the divsion of family caused the negative e¤etct, because the number of user …rms increase concavely.…”

Section: Linear Regression Modelsmentioning

confidence: 99%

Prevention of Competition by Competition Law: Evidence from Unbundling Regulation on Fiber-Optic Networks in Japan

Minamihashi

2011

SSRN Journal

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“…Regulation that increased incentives for entry over existing networks could undermine incentives for new, facilities-based entry. For example, a study by Crandall et al (2004) showed that lower rates for unbundled network elements led to less facilities-based entry by competitive telephone companies. Also, if vertical foreclosure is in fact profit maximizing, then unbundling and open access could distort the investment incentives of the incumbent conduit.…”

Section: Arguments For and Against Unbundling And Open Accessmentioning

confidence: 99%

Regulating Vertical Integration in Broadband: Open Access versus Common Carriage

Hogendorn¹

2005

Review of Network Economics

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Broadband Internet involves two vertical relationships: the Internet Service Provider (ISP) requires both a physical conduit (e.g. telephone or cable television lines) and content. The ISP-conduit relationship has been subject to controversial unbundling regulation, but no such rules apply to the ISP-content relationship. We argue that regardless of whether ISPs are vertically integrated with conduits, they have incentives to create vertical restrictions on content. Foreclosure of ISPs by conduits may not increase and indeed could reduce these restrictions. Thus, telephone common carriage and Internet application neutrality may both be at odds with unbundling and "open access" policies.

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Do Unbundling Policies Discourage CLEC Facilities-Based Investment

Cited by 56 publications

References 2 publications

Evidence for a Ladder of Investment in Central and Eastern European countries

Evidence for a Ladder of Investment in Central and Eastern European countries

Prevention of Competition by Competition Law: Evidence from Unbundling Regulation on Fiber-Optic Networks in Japan

Regulating Vertical Integration in Broadband: Open Access versus Common Carriage

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