Does teacher testing raise teacher quality? Evidence from state certification requirements

Abstract

Standard-Nutzungsbedingungen:Die Dokumente auf EconStor dürfen zu eigenen wissenschaftlichen Zwecken und zum Privatgebrauch gespeichert und kopiert werden.Sie dürfen die Dokumente nicht für öffentliche oder kommerzielle Zwecke vervielfältigen, öffentlich ausstellen, öffentlich zugänglich machen, vertreiben oder anderweitig nutzen.Sofern die Verfasser die Dokumente unter Open-Content-Lizenzen (insbesondere CC-Lizenzen) zur Verfügung gestellt haben sollten, gelten abweichend von diesen Nutzungsbedingungen die in der dort genannten Lizenz gewährten Nutzungsrechte. The Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA) in Bonn is a local and virtual international research center and a place of communication between science, politics and business. IZA is an independent nonprofit company supported by Deutsche Post World Net. The center is associated with the University of Bonn and offers a stimulating research environment through its research networks, research support, and visitors and doctoral programs. IZA engages in (i) original and internationally competitive research in all fields of labor economics, (ii) development of policy concepts, and (iii) dissemination of research results and concepts to the interested public. Terms of use: Documents in D I S C U S S I O N P A P E R S E R I E SIZA Discussion Papers often represent preliminary work and are circulated to encourage discussion. Citation of such a paper should account for its provisional character. A revised version may be available directly from the author. The education reform movement includes efforts to raise teacher quality through stricter certification and licensing provisions. Most US states now require public school teachers to pass a standardized test such as the Praxis. Although any barrier to entry is likely to raise wages in the affected occupation, the theoretical effects of such requirements on teacher quality are ambiguous. Teacher testing places a floor on whatever skills are measured by the required test, but testing is also costly for applicants. These costs shift teacher supply to the left and may be especially likely to deter high-quality applicants from teaching in public schools. Moreover, test requirements may disqualify some applicants that schools would otherwise want to hire. We use the Schools and Staffing Survey to estimate the effect of state teacher testing requirements on teacher wages and teacher quality as measured by educational background. The results suggest that state-mandated teacher testing increases teacher wages with no corresponding increase in quality. JEL Classification:I28, J44, J45

Examining Mathematics Teacher Content Knowledge: Policy and Practice

“…Similarly, Rivkin et al (2005) found no relationship between teacher certification test scores and standardized test scores for grades 4-8 students. Angrist and Guryan (2007) also found that general and subject-specific test scores had no impact on teacher quality.…”

Hvilken betydning har regulering av yrker for yrkesmobilitet i Norge?

“…Adgangen til å frata uegnede yrkesutøvere lisens bidrar til å holde utøverne på den smale sti, da tap av lisens vil føre til yrkesforbud. På den annen side kan høye adgangsbarrierer gjøre at de beste utøverne søker seg til andre yrker hvor investeringskostnadene ikke er like høye, spesielt hvis innsatsen for å bli godkjent ikke står i forhold til belønningen ved å vaere i yrket (Angrist & Guryan 2008).…”

“…Resultater fra flere amerikanske studier gir jevnt over lite støtte til at lisensiering øker kvaliteten på opplaeringen, målt som elevens laeringsutbytte (Kane, Rockoff & Steiger 2007;, ei heller blant privatskoler (Sharkey & Goldhaber 2008). Derimot viser Angrist & Guryan (2008) at laererlønningene er høyere i stater med krav til lisens, men laererne har verken en sterkere eller mer relevant utdanningsbakgrunn i disse statene sammenlignet med stater uten lisenskrav. Av den grunn konkluderer de med at lisensieringskravet først og fremst har en effekt på å redusere rekrutteringen til yrket, ikke nødvendigvis på å selektere kvalitativt bedre laerere til yrket.…”

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“…Such a consequence is considered in light of the decline in the attractiveness of the teaching profession, which lacks occupational prestige, generous salaries, and opportunities for growth and advancement. In addition to several other non-attractive factors, such as heavy workloads and student disciplinary problems, imposing higher standards for entering the profession may discourage many qualified candidates interested in pursuing a career in education (Angrist & Guryan, 2008).…”