Doing Things That Can't Be Done: Creating an New Defense Establishment

Abstract

Chiefs of Staff (CJCS) for "Bush 41," and together they helped lead the United States and an international coalition to victory over Iraq during the Gulf War. Back in 1975-77, Rumsfeld served for President Ford as the youngest SECDEF ever, and was a successful CEO for several corporations prior to his second time as SECDEF. 1 Each one advocated a strong military, and together they had the knowledge, the experience, and the charm to implement a revolution in military affairs for the 21 st century. In his inaugural address, President Bush promised he would "build our defenses beyond challenge." 2 The hope of all in uniform was that the "Bush 43" team would restore the military to its heyday like their "prophet" Ronald Reagan did in the 1980s. Everyone began to spread the gospel according to Bush, including Bush. At the swearing-in ceremony for Rumsfeld, President Bush stated: "we will strengthen the bond of trust between the American people and those who wear our nation's uniforms. We will give then the tools they need and the respect they deserve…. we will begin creating the military of the future, one that takes full advantage of revolutionary new technologies." 3 At his first visit to a military base after becoming vi Commander-In-Chief, he said, "We will do better…I have great goals for our military, to advance its technology, to rethink its strategy." 4 However, not long thereafter, reality settled in and the word went out to the troops not to get their hopes up too high, not to expect any major build-up or budget increase, because it just was not the right time. Instead, SECDEF Rumsfeld's mission of producing the congressionally mandated Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR), dubbed the "Rumsfeld Review," seemed to turn into a task to trim the military. Rumsfeld looked at major force structure cuts (like reducing two Army Divisions, one Navy carrier battle group, and one Air Force fighter wing), retiring the Air Force's B-1 bomber, and starting a new round of Base Realignment and Closure. 5 None of these came to pass. After seven months of exhaustive research and secret meetings, the SECDEF was forced to leave things basically status quo and let the services work some individual changes around the edges. Rumsfeld had previously suggested that rather than proposing cuts in the Defense Planning Guidance, he would leave it up to the various components of the department to determine whether and which cuts may be necessary to meet DPG goals. On Aug. 23, he offered some more detail on this process. He said the DPG will address components of DoD, requesting them to "come back with proposals that fit these constraints and these priorities with respect to the things we opined on in the guidance. With respect to the other things, come back with your best recommendations." 6 The current balance of power in Washington, D.C. makes it extremely difficult to implement significant change. Major change is often politically too hard to accomplish. As Thom Shanker of the New York Times puts it, "During the long summer of debate over...