2021
DOI: 10.48550/arxiv.2110.03154
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DoubleStar: Long-Range Attack Towards Depth Estimation based Obstacle Avoidance in Autonomous Systems

Ce Zhou,
Qiben Yan,
Yan Shi
et al.

Abstract: Depth estimation-based obstacle avoidance has been widely adopted by autonomous systems (drones and vehicles) for safety purpose. It normally relies on a stereo camera to automatically detect obstacles and make flying/driving decisions, e.g., stopping several meters ahead of the obstacle in the path or moving away from the detected obstacle. In this paper, we explore new security risks associated with the stereo visionbased depth estimation algorithms used for obstacle avoidance. By exploiting the weaknesses o… Show more

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Cited by 3 publications
(2 citation statements)
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“…Bad actors can modify the lane-keeping system by installing dirty road patches and ultimately causing the ADV to drift away from its lane (Sato et al, 2021). Jamming the cameras' modules (Panoff et al, 2021) or LIDAR spoofing attacks (Zhou et al, 2021) to inject false obstacle depth lead to false sensor data and hence causes the ADV data processing chain to compute erroneous control commands. In these cases, the health of the sensors is not compromised hence remain undetected by traditional fault detection schemes.…”
mentioning
confidence: 99%
“…Bad actors can modify the lane-keeping system by installing dirty road patches and ultimately causing the ADV to drift away from its lane (Sato et al, 2021). Jamming the cameras' modules (Panoff et al, 2021) or LIDAR spoofing attacks (Zhou et al, 2021) to inject false obstacle depth lead to false sensor data and hence causes the ADV data processing chain to compute erroneous control commands. In these cases, the health of the sensors is not compromised hence remain undetected by traditional fault detection schemes.…”
mentioning
confidence: 99%
“…Several works have used non-GPS techniques for a hostile takeover of UAVs. These include the use of lasers to activate obstacle detection and avoidance systems [250], attacking the data-link between the radio-controller and the UAV [198] and [188] where the authors showcase the vulnerabilities present in a popular UAV platform from Parrot [12] as a result of a poorly configured wireless network.…”
Section: Related Workmentioning
confidence: 99%