Dual-Process Theories, Cognitive Decoupling and the Outcome-to-Intent Shift: A Developmental Perspective on Evolutionary Ethics

Abstract

Dual-process theories, cognitive decoupling and the outcome-to-intent shift: A developmental perspective on evolutionary ethicsAbstract/Introduction A central tenet of evolutionary ethics is that as a result of evolutionary processes, humans tend to respond in certain ways to particular moral problems. Various authors (particularly those associated with "dual-process" theories of reasoning) have posited conflicts between "fast", automatic, evolved impulses and more controlled judgements that may be more flexible and respond to culturally determined. In this chapter we argue that the evolutionary sources of automatic moral judgements are quite diverse, and include some intuitive processes (specifically, reading other people's intentions) that are quite sophisticated from a social-cognitive point of view. We further argue that processes of controlled, reflective moral reasoning represent the activity of higher-level process that arbitrate between conflicting inputs from diverse automatic heuristics, in response to normative concerns. The integration and subjugation of automatic responses to more reflective ones is a developmental process that develops at varying rates in different people and in different cultural contexts. To make this argument, we first consider how approaches that represent cognition in terms of two types of processesincluding but not limited to the automatic/reflective distinctioncan be rendered more sophisticated by a consideration of evolutionary developmental psychology.We then apply this more developmentally aware approach to an extended example of the phenomenon in children's moral development known as the outcome/intent shift. We finish by outlining a model that shows how automatic and controlled processes may be integrated in children's social learning in culturally variable ways. An Evolutionary-Developmental Perspective on Dual-Process Theories of CognitionMost evolutionarily inspired approaches to psychology, including moral psychology, view adult cognitive functioning as designed by evolution to solve adult adaptive problems.An example is the moral foundations theory of Haidt and colleagues (Graham et al., 2013), which sees moral cognition as responding to different kinds of triggers, each with relevance for differing aspects of fitness, including care/harm, fairness/cheating, loyalty/betrayal, authority/subversion, and sanctity/degradation (see Suhler & Churchland, 2011, for an extended critique). All these themes are couched in terms of the decisions that adult