Economics as intervention: Expert struggles over quantitative easing at the Bank of England

Abstract

How does a technocratic entity, such as a central bank, craft a key policy intervention when faced with limits to established frameworks of governance? This article explores the Bank of England’s turn to unconventional policy in 2009 drawing on a set of eighteen in-depth interviews with former members of the Monetary Policy Committee, Executive team, and staff economists, and a corpus of documents. Adopting Goffman’s ‘framing analysis’, it argues that the limits to established governance led to the temporary replacement of the New Keynesian frame with a Monetarist frame, as a result of expert struggles, with consequential outcomes on the policy intervention. As the backstage dissensus spilled over onto the frontstage, manifesting as limits to knowledge, the Bank’s ‘expert authority’ was threatened. The Bank engaged in ‘manufactured consensus’—a backstage compromise between competing frames forged into a frontstage consensus via a hybrid frame—which proved to be a fragile strategy. By throwing light on the backstage–frontstage relations of technocratic organizations, I claim that an intervention may be shaped both by internal processes as well as by the ways in which the organization seeks to handle the external demands to which those very same internal processes may give rise.