Editorial introduction to ‘truth: concept meets property’

Abstract

The papers in this special issue investigate a range of topics that pertain to the distinction between the concept and the property of truth. The distinction between property concepts and the properties that they pick out is a mainstay within analytic philosophy. We have learned to distinguish, for instance, between our ordinary concept simultaneous and the property simultaneity that it picks out. 1 The significance of this distinction is borne out in the theories of reference that were developed, for instance, by Putnam (1975), Kripke (1980), andLewis (1984). If we apply any of these theories to simultaneous, they will generate the result that this concept refers to the relativized property simultaneity, even if many users of the concept take simultaneity to be absolute. The concept-property distinction in truth theory: Alston's constraintUndoubtedly, then, it is important to draw the general distinction between property concepts and properties themselves. What, though, is this meant to show us about truth? Arguably, the locus classicus for thought on this topic is the work of William Alston, who observes of the concept-property distinction that "discussions of truth are led seriously astray by neglecting it." 2 Alston brings out the relevance of the distinction to theories of truth as follows 3 :

Primitivist theories of truth: Their history and prospects

“…1–2, 2021), Eklund (2021, § 2), Lynch (2005, 2009, chap. 1), Scharp (2021a, b), and Wyatt (2018, 2021a).…”