Educating Parliamentarians about Intelligence: The Role of the British Intelligence and Security Committee

Concluding Remarks: The Narrative of Security and Pathways of Transition

“…On the eve of the vote, the Spanish Foreign Minister reiterated Spain's opinion that EU membership would not be automatic and would require unanimous support from EU member states. 35 'An independent Scotland would be forced to wait at least five years to join the EU and would then have to sign up to the euro, the Spanish government […] warned'. 36 However, not all EU actors shared this perspective.…”

“…34 The common Nordic labour market, first agreed to in 1954 (agreement renewed in 1982), reflects a 'fundamental right for nationals of the Nordic countries to be able freely to take up employment and settle in another Nordic country'. 35 Intra-Nordic trade is extensive: 19% of Nordic exports go to other Nordic countries and 22% of Nordic imports come from other Nordic countries. Greenland (86.6%), Faroe Islands (62.6%) and Iceland (27.9%) import the most from other Nordic states whereas Greenland (93.7%), Sweden (24.7%) and Denmark (23.0%) export the most to their co-Nordics.…”

Disruption and deniable interventionism: explaining the appeal of covert action and Special Forces in contemporary British policy

“…139 Perhaps most importantly regarding covert action, it was charged with examining policy, rather than operational or 'individual cases'. 140 Aside from select committee statements, evidence of this weakness can be found in two other areas. First, ISC reports offer little discussion of covert action beyond an acknowledgement that it is undertaken.…”

'New Mechanisms of Independent Accountability': Select Committees and Parliamentary Scrutiny of the Intelligence Services

“…The question of whether the select committees have a role in scrutinising the work of the intelligence and security agencies has been the subject of considerable debate (Defty, 2008;Phythian, 2007), and has led to what some MPs have described as a 'turf war' between a number of select committees and the ISC. In interviews, ministers and members of the ISC frequently questioned the legitimacy of select committee interest in intelligence, tending to attribute it to ambition on the part of some select committees to take on the role of the ISC, while select committee members and many other backbenchers defended the right of committees to, in the words of one MP, 'range as far and wide as they like'.…”