Effective Vote Markets and the Tyranny of Wealth

Abstract

What limits should there be on the areas of life that are governed by market forces? For many years, no one seriously defended the buying and selling votes for political elections. In recent years, however, this situation has changed, with a number of authors defending the permissibility of vote markets (e.g. Freiman 2014). One popular objection to such markets is that they would lead to a tyranny of wealth, where the poor are politically dominated by the rich. In a recent paper, Taylor (Res Publica 23(3):313-328, 2017.

Impartiality and democracy: an objection to political exchange

“…The equality argument against voting markets takes many forms. 3 The most recent and articulate form is the 'tyranny of wealth argument' (Taylor 2017b;Archer et al 2019). According to this argument a market in voting enables wealthier individuals to gain political influence at the expense of poorer individuals (Taylor 2017b: 314).…”

“…Two of the most common objections to the use of market mechanisms in voting are the equality objection and the inalienability objection. According to the first objection, the poor become more politically disadvantaged when vote trading is permitted (Archer et al 2019). The second objection asserts that there is something intrinsically or functionally problematic with the action of selling one’s vote (Radin 1987; Maloberti 2019).…”

Markets in votes: Alienability, strict secrecy, and political clientelism

“… 19. Regulatory measures designed to mitigate wealth effects might, however, also mitigate the potential benefits of markets in votes. On this point, see Archer et al (2017). …”

“… 6. An exception is the objection that sees the problem in the government being more likely to pursue policies that are distributively unjust. See, for example, Anderson and Tollision (1990) and Archer et al (2017). …”

“…Taylor (2016c) advances a specific regulatory remedy to address the concern that standard measures would be ineffective in preventing that the party favored by the poor would have to pay higher prices to attract rich voters. For assessments of Freiman’s and Taylor’s claims, see Archer and Wilson (2014) and Archer et al (2017).…”