Electoral Systems and Candidate Selection

Hazan, Reuven Y.; Voerman, Gerrit

doi:10.1057/palgrave.ap.5500153

Cited by 42 publications

(34 citation statements)

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“…The electoral rules condition and constrain the parties' menu of choices concerning candidate selection (Hazan and Voerman 2006). The central institutional variable of interest in this research is the specific voting system used in PR list electoral systems.…”

Section: The Structure Of Opportunities: Institutional Settingmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…Past research identifies four groups of variables affecting aspirants' chances in the candidate selection process: (i) individual characteristics summarising the traits the selectors are looking for in a candidate; (ii) party rules concerning who and at what level can elect / appoint candidates; (iii) institutional settings conditioning the selectors' choices; and (iv) wider contextual settings and selectors' perception of voter preferences (Gallagher and Marsh 1988;Hazan and Voerman 2006;Katz 1980;Norris 1997). This paper proceeds by covering the main expectations with regards to how these traditional predictors of candidate selection affect women's likelihood of viable candidacy.…”

Section: Party-determined Viable Candidacy In Pr List Systemsmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…Candidate selection not only determines the choices given to voters -which influences how the vote choice is perceived and made -but it also determines the composition of the parties in the legislature (Crotty 1968;Hazan and Voerman 2006).…”

Section: Party-determined Viable Candidacy In Pr List Systemsmentioning

confidence: 99%

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Party Gatekeepers' Support for Viable Female Candidacy in PR-List Systems

Lühiste

2015

Pol & Gen

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More women are elected in proportional compared to majority / plurality electoral systems.However, the share of women among the elected representatives varies greatly between different types of PR systems, most notably between preferential and non-preferential PR-list systems. Considerable scholarly attention has been paid to how the voters with preference votes influence the election of women. But we have limited knowledge of how the party gatekeepers' behaviour influences the election of women in different types of PR-list systems. This paper aims to fill this gap by studying cross-nationally female candidates' partydetermined viability in different types of PR-list systems. The results suggest that women are placed lower in the electoral lists in ordered list preferential compared to closed list nonpreferential voting systems. The results also show that party gatekeepers respond to the overall levels of gender equality in the society, but only if the candidate selection within the party is centralised.

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Section: The Structure Of Opportunities: Institutional Settingmentioning

confidence: 99%

Section: Party-determined Viable Candidacy In Pr List Systemsmentioning

confidence: 99%

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Party Gatekeepers' Support for Viable Female Candidacy in PR-List Systems

Lühiste

2015

Pol & Gen

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“…While some comparative case studies argue that electoral institutions should have substantial impacts on choices of CSMs, particularly in terms of ballot structure and district magnitude (Norris 1997;Kasapovic 2001), other recent large-N studies show that the empirical evidence is meager at best (Lundell 2004;Shomer 2012). From the perspective of level of analysis, Hazan and Voerman (2006) point out that electoral systems are a country-level variable that may not account for intracountry, cross-party variation in CSMs. Gallagher and Marsh (1988) are perhaps correct in positing that electoral systems do not, by themselves, completely determine CSMs, yet it is certainly possible that electoral systems exert some degree of inluence.…”

Section: Resultsmentioning

confidence: 99%

Mixed-Member Electoral Systems in Constitutional Context

Batto¹,

Huang²,

Tan³

et al. 2016

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Reformers have promoted mixed-member electoral systems as the "best of both worlds." In this volume, internationally recognized political scientists evaluate the ways in which the introduction of a mixed-member electoral system affects the coniguration of political parties. The contributors examine several political phenomena, including cabinet post allocation, nominations, preelectoral coalitions, split-ticket voting, and the size of party systems and faction systems. Signiicantly, they also consider various ways in which the constitutional system-especially whether the head of government is elected directly or indirectly-can modify the incentives created by the electoral system. Part I of the book provides an in-depth comparison of Taiwan and Japan, both of which moved from single nontransferable vote systems to mixed-member majoritarian systems. These cases demonstrate that the higher the payoffs of attaining the executive ofice and the greater degree of cross-district coordination required to win it, the stronger the incentives for elites to form and stay in the major parties. In such a context, a country will move rapidly toward a two-party system. In Part II, the contributors apply this theoretical logic to other countries with mixed-member systems and ind that executive competition has the same effect on legislative electoral rules in countries as disparate as Thailand, the Philippines, New Zealand, Bolivia, and Russia.The indings presented here demonstrate that the success of electoral reform depends not only on the speciication of new electoral rules per se but also on the political context-and especially the constitutional framework-within which such rules are embedded. AcknowledgmentsThe genesis of this volume lies in an attempt to answer a basic research question that surfaced in a roundtable of the second annual Asian Election Studies Conference held at the Election Study Center (ESC) of the National Chengchi University (NCCU), Taiwan, in May 2010. Why was it that Taiwan and Japan, two similar East Asian countries that had both switched from similar single nontransferable vote to similar mixed-member majoritarian legislative electoral systems, had displayed such divergent speeds and degrees in moving toward the theoretically expected consolidation of their party systems? A brainstorm with Gary Cox during his visit to the ESC in November 2011 sparked the idea of taking into account the constitutional context in which the electoral systems operate.As with any book-length project, we have a number of people and institutions to thank. We thank the ESC and its director, Lu-huei Chen, for continuous administrative support throughout the life of the project. A book with twenty-one coauthors based in ifteen institutions spanning four countries needs some sort of institutional base, and the ESC provided that home. We also wish to acknowledge our four home institutions, the Institute of Political Science at Academia Sinica, National Chengchi University, the University of Canterbury, and Stanford University. ...

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“…Two months later, Pechtold presented his Policy Studies 381 government's agenda for democratic reform and this involved the creation of a Civic Forum on the Electoral System for the Second Chamber. 6 This was the first time in the country's history that a civic forum (hereafter described as the Netherlands Citizen's Assembly or NLA) would be established at the national level and was the result of a number of failed previous attempts to consider electoral reform, most recently the rejection of proposals by the second chamber in February 2005 (Hazan and Voerman 2006). The Cabinet therefore decided that a civic forum would not only provide an innovative democratic experiment but also one that might be able to break through the existing impasse.…”

Section: The Netherlandsmentioning

confidence: 99%

Deliberative democracy, elite politics and electoral reform

Flinders

Curry

2008

Policy Studies

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Many advanced liberal democracies exhibit 'democracy deserts' in which high levels of social exclusion among large sections of the population are compounded by low levels of democratic engagement. How to reverse declining levels of electoral participation and widespread public disenchantment with politics therefore forms a defining element of contemporary comparative politics. It is in this context that the processes and methods associated with 'deliberative democracy' have become significant. Whereas most research in this field has focused on experiments at the local or community level, this article utilises a comparative case-study approach to examine the recent use of deliberative mechanisms in relation to constitutional issues. By comparing the establishment of citizen's assemblies with varying powers to review and make recommendations on electoral reform in the Canadian province of British Columbia and in the Netherlands and then contrasting this with a polity where a highly-majoritarian elite has reneged on pre-election commitments to review the electoral system (the United Kingdom), this article contributes a distinctive perspective to broader debates on public disengagement, deliberative democracy, political geography, majoritarian modification and electoral reform.

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Electoral Systems and Candidate Selection

Cited by 42 publications

References 12 publications

Party Gatekeepers' Support for Viable Female Candidacy in PR-List Systems

Party Gatekeepers' Support for Viable Female Candidacy in PR-List Systems

Mixed-Member Electoral Systems in Constitutional Context

Deliberative democracy, elite politics and electoral reform

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