Elevating the peasants into high-rise apartments: The land bill system in Chongqing as a solution for land conflicts in China?

Collective action in implementing top-down land policy: The case of Chengdu, China

“…Despite participation in the CURCL policy being voluntary and despite many villagers gaining better housing as a result (Yep and Forrest, 2016), most commentaries have been largely critical of the land transfer process, with the farmers themselves portrayed in the main as powerless and with little social capital to defend their position (Long, et al, 2012;Huang, et al, 2013). This disempowerment has been attributed to defects in the CURCL policy which, it is argued, has provided strong incentives for local governments to put their own financial self-interest ahead of local people (Tang, et al, 2012).…”

“…This has led to considerable controversy and conflict in the allocation of land, particularly relating to decisions to convert agricultural land into construction land on the urban fringe (Tang, et al, 2012;Liang, et al, 2015;Jin, et al, 2016;Yep and Forrest, 2016). Not only has this changed the character of peri-urban land, but it has threatened local food supplies (Yang and Li, 2000;Chen, 2009;Zhou, 2010;Jiang, et al, 2015;Fang, et al, 2016) and has changed the culture of rural life (Friedman, 2006;Xu, et al, 2011;Siciliano, 2012;Li, et al, 2014).…”

“…Research has found that it has been effective in reducing conflict between conservation and development (Tang, et al, 2012) and that it has contributed to the improvement of farmers' housing conditions (see Dou, et al, 2008;Long, et al, 2011;Huang, et al, 2013;Yep and Forrest, 2016). However, it is also clear that not all those involved have been equally enthusiastic, with the strongest motivation for implementing the policy coming from local government and external investors, rather than farmers (Long, et al, 2012;Tang, et al, 2012).…”

“…However, it is also clear that not all those involved have been equally enthusiastic, with the strongest motivation for implementing the policy coming from local government and external investors, rather than farmers (Long, et al, 2012;Tang, et al, 2012). Indeed, perhaps the greatest indictment of the policy has been the general lack of official recognition that there has been for the negative impact that it has had on the culture and economy of many farming households (Xu, et al, 2011;Siciliano, 2012;Tang, et al, 2012;Huang, et al, 2013;Yep and Forrest, 2016), and its wider contribution to declining local food security (Chen, 2009;Zhou, 2010;Jiang, et al, 2015).…”

Grabbing Land for Equitable Development? Reengineering Land Dispossession through Securitising Land Development Rights in Chongqing

“…Chongqing's development is highly uneven. Residents from Chongqing's vast rural areas earn much less than their urban counterparts do, and the gap was higher than the national average (Yep and Forrest 2016). In 2007, before Chongqing introduced dipiao and other reforms, annual per capita net income of rural households was 3509 RMB while annual per capita disposable income of urban households was 13,715 RMB (Chongqing Statistics Bureau 2001.…”